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Research on Evolutionary Game of Collaborative Innovation Among High - Tech Industries - From the Perspective of Trust Relationship

Received: 9 December 2022    Accepted: 3 January 2023    Published: 17 January 2023
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Abstract

In the era of 'Internet+' background, large flow, strong liquidity and short shelf life become the characteristics of information, technology specialization, increasing complexity, it is difficult for individual enterprises to grasp all the elements needed for successful innovation. In order to study the problem of collaborative innovation among high-tech inadustries, from the perspective of trust relationship between subjects, an evolutionary game model of collaborative innovation is constructed based on the technology intensity and spillover of high-tech industries, and the strategy evolution of subjects under market mechanism and government regulation is analyzed. The results show that innovation output and technology transformation ability promote collaborative innovation; r & D costs, 'free rider' income and so on hinder the collaborative innovation between industries; the influence of trust relationship and distribution coefficient on collaborative innovation depends on the situation. In addition, through simulation, it is found that the reward and punishment mechanisms of policies have their own advantages and disadvantages and complement each other, and the impact of supervision on collaborative innovation is diminishing marginal benefits. It is found that a reasonable policy combination can stimulate innovation potential more effectively. It is proposed that the strong technology spillover and mutual solubility between high-tech industries also lead to technology imitation. In the process of collaborative R & D, it is necessary to establish a solid strategic partnership, adhere to trust rationality, grasp the scale, and promote collaborative innovation. Under the principle of trust rationality, information sharing, cost sharing, and efforts to increase technology and information output can increase innovation benefits; the government should follow the economic law when making policies, rationally combine policies, make good use of the 'push' and 'pull' of the policy reward and punishment mechanism, promote collaborative innovation among industries, and enhance the driving force of innovation for economic development.

Published in International Journal of Business and Economics Research (Volume 12, Issue 1)
DOI 10.11648/j.ijber.20231201.12
Page(s) 9-17
Creative Commons

This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.

Copyright

Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Trust Relationship, High-Tech Industry, Collaborative Innovation, Evolutionary Game

References
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  • APA Style

    Huanzhou Hong. (2023). Research on Evolutionary Game of Collaborative Innovation Among High - Tech Industries - From the Perspective of Trust Relationship. International Journal of Business and Economics Research, 12(1), 9-17. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20231201.12

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    ACS Style

    Huanzhou Hong. Research on Evolutionary Game of Collaborative Innovation Among High - Tech Industries - From the Perspective of Trust Relationship. Int. J. Bus. Econ. Res. 2023, 12(1), 9-17. doi: 10.11648/j.ijber.20231201.12

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    AMA Style

    Huanzhou Hong. Research on Evolutionary Game of Collaborative Innovation Among High - Tech Industries - From the Perspective of Trust Relationship. Int J Bus Econ Res. 2023;12(1):9-17. doi: 10.11648/j.ijber.20231201.12

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  • @article{10.11648/j.ijber.20231201.12,
      author = {Huanzhou Hong},
      title = {Research on Evolutionary Game of Collaborative Innovation Among High - Tech Industries - From the Perspective of Trust Relationship},
      journal = {International Journal of Business and Economics Research},
      volume = {12},
      number = {1},
      pages = {9-17},
      doi = {10.11648/j.ijber.20231201.12},
      url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20231201.12},
      eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijber.20231201.12},
      abstract = {In the era of 'Internet+' background, large flow, strong liquidity and short shelf life become the characteristics of information, technology specialization, increasing complexity, it is difficult for individual enterprises to grasp all the elements needed for successful innovation. In order to study the problem of collaborative innovation among high-tech inadustries, from the perspective of trust relationship between subjects, an evolutionary game model of collaborative innovation is constructed based on the technology intensity and spillover of high-tech industries, and the strategy evolution of subjects under market mechanism and government regulation is analyzed. The results show that innovation output and technology transformation ability promote collaborative innovation; r & D costs, 'free rider' income and so on hinder the collaborative innovation between industries; the influence of trust relationship and distribution coefficient on collaborative innovation depends on the situation. In addition, through simulation, it is found that the reward and punishment mechanisms of policies have their own advantages and disadvantages and complement each other, and the impact of supervision on collaborative innovation is diminishing marginal benefits. It is found that a reasonable policy combination can stimulate innovation potential more effectively. It is proposed that the strong technology spillover and mutual solubility between high-tech industries also lead to technology imitation. In the process of collaborative R & D, it is necessary to establish a solid strategic partnership, adhere to trust rationality, grasp the scale, and promote collaborative innovation. Under the principle of trust rationality, information sharing, cost sharing, and efforts to increase technology and information output can increase innovation benefits; the government should follow the economic law when making policies, rationally combine policies, make good use of the 'push' and 'pull' of the policy reward and punishment mechanism, promote collaborative innovation among industries, and enhance the driving force of innovation for economic development.},
     year = {2023}
    }
    

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  • TY  - JOUR
    T1  - Research on Evolutionary Game of Collaborative Innovation Among High - Tech Industries - From the Perspective of Trust Relationship
    AU  - Huanzhou Hong
    Y1  - 2023/01/17
    PY  - 2023
    N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20231201.12
    DO  - 10.11648/j.ijber.20231201.12
    T2  - International Journal of Business and Economics Research
    JF  - International Journal of Business and Economics Research
    JO  - International Journal of Business and Economics Research
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    EP  - 17
    PB  - Science Publishing Group
    SN  - 2328-756X
    UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20231201.12
    AB  - In the era of 'Internet+' background, large flow, strong liquidity and short shelf life become the characteristics of information, technology specialization, increasing complexity, it is difficult for individual enterprises to grasp all the elements needed for successful innovation. In order to study the problem of collaborative innovation among high-tech inadustries, from the perspective of trust relationship between subjects, an evolutionary game model of collaborative innovation is constructed based on the technology intensity and spillover of high-tech industries, and the strategy evolution of subjects under market mechanism and government regulation is analyzed. The results show that innovation output and technology transformation ability promote collaborative innovation; r & D costs, 'free rider' income and so on hinder the collaborative innovation between industries; the influence of trust relationship and distribution coefficient on collaborative innovation depends on the situation. In addition, through simulation, it is found that the reward and punishment mechanisms of policies have their own advantages and disadvantages and complement each other, and the impact of supervision on collaborative innovation is diminishing marginal benefits. It is found that a reasonable policy combination can stimulate innovation potential more effectively. It is proposed that the strong technology spillover and mutual solubility between high-tech industries also lead to technology imitation. In the process of collaborative R & D, it is necessary to establish a solid strategic partnership, adhere to trust rationality, grasp the scale, and promote collaborative innovation. Under the principle of trust rationality, information sharing, cost sharing, and efforts to increase technology and information output can increase innovation benefits; the government should follow the economic law when making policies, rationally combine policies, make good use of the 'push' and 'pull' of the policy reward and punishment mechanism, promote collaborative innovation among industries, and enhance the driving force of innovation for economic development.
    VL  - 12
    IS  - 1
    ER  - 

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Author Information
  • College of Business Administration, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang, China

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