Consciousness is very fundamental to human existence. It is one of the basic necessities for all the living creatures of the universe. It does not only assist human beings to experience both gross (table, chair, etc.) and subtle objects (hunger, thirst, feelings, etc.) of the world but also assist in acquiring knowledge about worldly affairs. Human beings acquire knowledge due to their mental representation of objects and concepts of the world. In this regard, the notion of ‘consciousness’ and the concept of ‘mental representation’ are interrelated with each other. The functionalists (computer scientists, cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, and others) suggest that a person’s body and brain are interrelated with each other due to the presence of consciousness in every part of body and brain. But they could not answer an important question, that is, in what ways body and brain of a person are connected to each other? This paper attempts to answer this question from a functionalist perspective. While answering this question, it argues that the emergence of consciousness in a person is not due to his/her brain functions, but due to the presence of ‘self’ in a person from birth to death.
| Published in | International Journal of Philosophy (Volume 10, Issue 1) |
| DOI | 10.11648/j.ijp.20221001.11 |
| Page(s) | 1-6 |
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This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Brain, Body, Consciousness, Intentionality, Representation, Self
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APA Style
Suresh Muruganandam. (2022). ‘Consciousness’ and Brain Functions: A Re-look from Functionalist Perspective. International Journal of Philosophy, 10(1), 1-6. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20221001.11
ACS Style
Suresh Muruganandam. ‘Consciousness’ and Brain Functions: A Re-look from Functionalist Perspective. Int. J. Philos. 2022, 10(1), 1-6. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20221001.11
AMA Style
Suresh Muruganandam. ‘Consciousness’ and Brain Functions: A Re-look from Functionalist Perspective. Int J Philos. 2022;10(1):1-6. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20221001.11
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Download@article{10.11648/j.ijp.20221001.11,
author = {Suresh Muruganandam},
title = {‘Consciousness’ and Brain Functions: A Re-look from Functionalist Perspective},
journal = {International Journal of Philosophy},
volume = {10},
number = {1},
pages = {1-6},
doi = {10.11648/j.ijp.20221001.11},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20221001.11},
eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijp.20221001.11},
abstract = {Consciousness is very fundamental to human existence. It is one of the basic necessities for all the living creatures of the universe. It does not only assist human beings to experience both gross (table, chair, etc.) and subtle objects (hunger, thirst, feelings, etc.) of the world but also assist in acquiring knowledge about worldly affairs. Human beings acquire knowledge due to their mental representation of objects and concepts of the world. In this regard, the notion of ‘consciousness’ and the concept of ‘mental representation’ are interrelated with each other. The functionalists (computer scientists, cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, and others) suggest that a person’s body and brain are interrelated with each other due to the presence of consciousness in every part of body and brain. But they could not answer an important question, that is, in what ways body and brain of a person are connected to each other? This paper attempts to answer this question from a functionalist perspective. While answering this question, it argues that the emergence of consciousness in a person is not due to his/her brain functions, but due to the presence of ‘self’ in a person from birth to death.},
year = {2022}
}
TY - JOUR T1 - ‘Consciousness’ and Brain Functions: A Re-look from Functionalist Perspective AU - Suresh Muruganandam Y1 - 2022/01/18 PY - 2022 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20221001.11 DO - 10.11648/j.ijp.20221001.11 T2 - International Journal of Philosophy JF - International Journal of Philosophy JO - International Journal of Philosophy SP - 1 EP - 6 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2330-7455 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20221001.11 AB - Consciousness is very fundamental to human existence. It is one of the basic necessities for all the living creatures of the universe. It does not only assist human beings to experience both gross (table, chair, etc.) and subtle objects (hunger, thirst, feelings, etc.) of the world but also assist in acquiring knowledge about worldly affairs. Human beings acquire knowledge due to their mental representation of objects and concepts of the world. In this regard, the notion of ‘consciousness’ and the concept of ‘mental representation’ are interrelated with each other. The functionalists (computer scientists, cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, and others) suggest that a person’s body and brain are interrelated with each other due to the presence of consciousness in every part of body and brain. But they could not answer an important question, that is, in what ways body and brain of a person are connected to each other? This paper attempts to answer this question from a functionalist perspective. While answering this question, it argues that the emergence of consciousness in a person is not due to his/her brain functions, but due to the presence of ‘self’ in a person from birth to death. VL - 10 IS - 1 ER -
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