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Switching to Semi-annual Financial Statement Reports - Market Reaction, Audit Fee and Corporate Governance Quality

Received: 25 October 2021    Accepted: 15 November 2021    Published: 23 November 2021
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Abstract

The aim of the research is to examine the reaction of market participants (investors and firms) to a regulatory exogenous shock of easing financial reporting statement regulations. Since 2017, small cap firms, publicly traded on Tel-Aviv stock exchange, are required to publish only Semi-annual reports hence any firm may opt to switch from formerly mandatory quarterly reporting to the currently required semi-annual financial reporting statement. We show that 2/3 of the firms chose to adopt the relief in regulation. In the group of firms that chose to apply the regulation relief, we find a significant negative abnormal market reaction of -2% to the announcement of adopting the relief. In the group of firms that waive the regulation relief and chose to stay on quarterly reporting, we observe a significant positive abnormal market reaction of +2.5% to the announcement of voluntary continuing with the quarterly financial reports. Moreover, for the firms that switch to semi-annual reports, we show a significant decrease of 19.8% in the number of external auditing hours and a significant decrease of 16% in the annual external total audit fee in 2017 as compared to 2016. No significant change in the annual external total audit fee has been observed for the firms that opted not to adopt the abovementioned regulation. We also collect additional information about institutional investor holdings and outside directors which serves on these boards (financial expertise, gender and "busyness") as signals to corporate governance quality. We find positive and significant associations between the voluntarily continue the quarterly financial reporting and high quality corporate governance. The findings of the event study provide a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate on the relevance of the quarterly financial reports to investors. The additional finding of lower corporate governance quality and decreased external audit effort which characterized the firms that adopt the relief represent an increased risk for information asymmetry for investors in such firms thus further reinforces the importance of frequent financial reporting.

Published in Journal of Finance and Accounting (Volume 9, Issue 6)
DOI 10.11648/j.jfa.20210906.15
Page(s) 249-257
Creative Commons

This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.

Copyright

Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Financial Reports, Relevance, Market Reaction, Corporate Governance, Audit Fee, Semi-annual, Quarterly

References
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[3] Bhojraj, S., Libby, R., 2005. Capital market pressure, disclosure frequency-induced earnings/cash flow conflict, and managerial myopia. The Accounting Review 80, 1-20.
[4] Botosan, C., 1997, Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital, The Accounting Review, Vol. 72 (3): 323.
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[6] Castro, W. B. L., Peleias, R. I., & da Silva, G. P., 2015. Determinants of Audit Fees: a Study in the Companies Listed on the BM & FBOVESPA, Brazil, R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, 26 (69), 261-273.
[7] Charitou, A., Floropoulos, N., Karamanou, I., and Loizides, G., 2018, Non-GAAP earnings disclosures on the face of the income statement by UK firms: The effect on market liquidity. International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 53, 183–202.
[8] Dye, R., 1985, Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 23 (1), pp. 123–45.
[9] Einhorn, E., 2007, Voluntary disclosure under uncertainty about the reporting objective. Journal of Accounting and Economics 43, 245-274.
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[17] Lev, B. and Gu, F., 2016. The end of accounting and the path forward for investors and managers. John Wiley & Sons. Li, Y. and Lang, L., 2014, June.
[18] Lev, B., 2018. "The deteriorating usefulness of financial report information and how to reverse it," Accounting and Business Research, vol. 48 (5), pages 465-493.
[19] Lokman, N, Cotter, J and Mula, J., 2011, 'Corporate governance quality, incentive factors and voluntary corporate governance disclosures in annual reports of Malaysian Publicly Listed Companies', Paper Under Review for Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics Thesis.
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Cite This Article
  • APA Style

    Keren Bar-Hava. (2021). Switching to Semi-annual Financial Statement Reports - Market Reaction, Audit Fee and Corporate Governance Quality. Journal of Finance and Accounting, 9(6), 249-257. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20210906.15

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    ACS Style

    Keren Bar-Hava. Switching to Semi-annual Financial Statement Reports - Market Reaction, Audit Fee and Corporate Governance Quality. J. Finance Account. 2021, 9(6), 249-257. doi: 10.11648/j.jfa.20210906.15

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    AMA Style

    Keren Bar-Hava. Switching to Semi-annual Financial Statement Reports - Market Reaction, Audit Fee and Corporate Governance Quality. J Finance Account. 2021;9(6):249-257. doi: 10.11648/j.jfa.20210906.15

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  • @article{10.11648/j.jfa.20210906.15,
      author = {Keren Bar-Hava},
      title = {Switching to Semi-annual Financial Statement Reports - Market Reaction, Audit Fee and Corporate Governance Quality},
      journal = {Journal of Finance and Accounting},
      volume = {9},
      number = {6},
      pages = {249-257},
      doi = {10.11648/j.jfa.20210906.15},
      url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20210906.15},
      eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jfa.20210906.15},
      abstract = {The aim of the research is to examine the reaction of market participants (investors and firms) to a regulatory exogenous shock of easing financial reporting statement regulations. Since 2017, small cap firms, publicly traded on Tel-Aviv stock exchange, are required to publish only Semi-annual reports hence any firm may opt to switch from formerly mandatory quarterly reporting to the currently required semi-annual financial reporting statement. We show that 2/3 of the firms chose to adopt the relief in regulation. In the group of firms that chose to apply the regulation relief, we find a significant negative abnormal market reaction of -2% to the announcement of adopting the relief. In the group of firms that waive the regulation relief and chose to stay on quarterly reporting, we observe a significant positive abnormal market reaction of +2.5% to the announcement of voluntary continuing with the quarterly financial reports. Moreover, for the firms that switch to semi-annual reports, we show a significant decrease of 19.8% in the number of external auditing hours and a significant decrease of 16% in the annual external total audit fee in 2017 as compared to 2016. No significant change in the annual external total audit fee has been observed for the firms that opted not to adopt the abovementioned regulation. We also collect additional information about institutional investor holdings and outside directors which serves on these boards (financial expertise, gender and "busyness") as signals to corporate governance quality. We find positive and significant associations between the voluntarily continue the quarterly financial reporting and high quality corporate governance. The findings of the event study provide a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate on the relevance of the quarterly financial reports to investors. The additional finding of lower corporate governance quality and decreased external audit effort which characterized the firms that adopt the relief represent an increased risk for information asymmetry for investors in such firms thus further reinforces the importance of frequent financial reporting.},
     year = {2021}
    }
    

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  • TY  - JOUR
    T1  - Switching to Semi-annual Financial Statement Reports - Market Reaction, Audit Fee and Corporate Governance Quality
    AU  - Keren Bar-Hava
    Y1  - 2021/11/23
    PY  - 2021
    N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20210906.15
    DO  - 10.11648/j.jfa.20210906.15
    T2  - Journal of Finance and Accounting
    JF  - Journal of Finance and Accounting
    JO  - Journal of Finance and Accounting
    SP  - 249
    EP  - 257
    PB  - Science Publishing Group
    SN  - 2330-7323
    UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20210906.15
    AB  - The aim of the research is to examine the reaction of market participants (investors and firms) to a regulatory exogenous shock of easing financial reporting statement regulations. Since 2017, small cap firms, publicly traded on Tel-Aviv stock exchange, are required to publish only Semi-annual reports hence any firm may opt to switch from formerly mandatory quarterly reporting to the currently required semi-annual financial reporting statement. We show that 2/3 of the firms chose to adopt the relief in regulation. In the group of firms that chose to apply the regulation relief, we find a significant negative abnormal market reaction of -2% to the announcement of adopting the relief. In the group of firms that waive the regulation relief and chose to stay on quarterly reporting, we observe a significant positive abnormal market reaction of +2.5% to the announcement of voluntary continuing with the quarterly financial reports. Moreover, for the firms that switch to semi-annual reports, we show a significant decrease of 19.8% in the number of external auditing hours and a significant decrease of 16% in the annual external total audit fee in 2017 as compared to 2016. No significant change in the annual external total audit fee has been observed for the firms that opted not to adopt the abovementioned regulation. We also collect additional information about institutional investor holdings and outside directors which serves on these boards (financial expertise, gender and "busyness") as signals to corporate governance quality. We find positive and significant associations between the voluntarily continue the quarterly financial reporting and high quality corporate governance. The findings of the event study provide a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate on the relevance of the quarterly financial reports to investors. The additional finding of lower corporate governance quality and decreased external audit effort which characterized the firms that adopt the relief represent an increased risk for information asymmetry for investors in such firms thus further reinforces the importance of frequent financial reporting.
    VL  - 9
    IS  - 6
    ER  - 

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Author Information
  • The School of Business Administration, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel

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