Supply-Chain Coopetition

Hans W. Gottinger

doi:doi:10.11648/j.ijber.20150402.16

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Supply-Chain Coopetition

Hans W. Gottinger

Received: 24 January 2015 Accepted: 9 February 2015 Published: 31 March 2015

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Abstract

This paper addresses the power struggle among supply chain partners. It is asserted that when firms are collaborating to deliver value in the market; the creation of critical asset requires more than just monopoly ownership of supply of a resource over competitors. A critical asset can only be truly owned and/or controlled effectively to leverage value if there is a dominance of one party in an exchange relationship over another. The implication is that to better understand the rent-earning capability of any supply chain resource, the relative power attributes of both buyer and supplier must be understood. Specifically these rents are earnings in excess of the firm's costs of production that are not eroded in the long run by new market entrants. In economic terms, rents persist in long-run equilibrium while profits tend towards zero.

DOI	10.11648/j.ijber.20150402.16
Published in	International Journal of Business and Economics Research (Volume 4, Issue 2, April 2015)
Page(s)	67-71
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Supply Chain, Outsourcing, Coopetition, Investment Strategy, Stochastic Games

References

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[4]	Gottinger, H.W., Innovation, Technology and Hypercompetition , Routledge: London (2006)
[5]	Fine,C,H, Clockspeed: Winning industry control in the age of temporary advantage, Perseus Publ.: New York (1999)
[6]	Fisher,F.M., Gowan,J. and Greenwood,J.E., Folded, Spindled and Mutulated, Economic Analysis and U.S. v. IBM, MIT Press: Cambridge,Ma (1983)
[7]	Cox, Andrew; Ireland, P., Lonsdale,C., Sanderson,J., Watson,G. , Supply chains, markets and power: Mapping buyer and supplier power regimes, Routledge :London , New York (2002)
[8]	Browne,S., ‘Stochastic Differential Portfolio Games’, Journal of Applied Probability 37,126-147 (2000)
[9]	Karatzas, I. ‘Applications of Stochastic Calculus in Financial Economics’, in J.S. Barras and V. Mirelli (eds.), Recent Advances in Stochastic Calculus, Springer: Berlin, 169-217 (1990)
[10]	Myerson, R.( Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Harvard Univ. Press: Cambridge, Ma (1991)
[11]	Huang,C. and Litzenberger,R., Foundations for Financial Economics, Elsevier: New York (1988)
[12]	Malliaris, A. G. and Brock, W. A. Stochastic Methods in Economics and Finance, North Holland: Amsterdam (1982)
[13]	Mertens, J.M., ‘Stochastic Games’, in Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 3, (R. Aumann and S. Hart, eds.), Elsevier, North Holland: Amsterdam, New York, 1809-1832 (2002)
[14]	Prahalad, C.K. and Hamel,G. , ‘The Core Competence of the Corporation’, Harvard Business Review , 79-91 (1990)

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Hans W. Gottinger. (2015). Supply-Chain Coopetition. International Journal of Business and Economics Research, 4(2), 67-71. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20150402.16

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ACS Style

Hans W. Gottinger. Supply-Chain Coopetition. Int. J. Bus. Econ. Res. 2015, 4(2), 67-71. doi: 10.11648/j.ijber.20150402.16

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AMA Style

Hans W. Gottinger. Supply-Chain Coopetition. Int J Bus Econ Res. 2015;4(2):67-71. doi: 10.11648/j.ijber.20150402.16

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@article{10.11648/j.ijber.20150402.16,
  author = {Hans W. Gottinger},
  title = {Supply-Chain Coopetition},
  journal = {International Journal of Business and Economics Research},
  volume = {4},
  number = {2},
  pages = {67-71},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijber.20150402.16},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20150402.16},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijber.20150402.16},
  abstract = {This paper addresses the power struggle among supply chain partners. It is asserted that when firms are collaborating to deliver value in the market; the creation of critical asset requires more than just monopoly ownership of supply of a resource over competitors. A critical asset can only be truly owned and/or controlled effectively to leverage value if there is a dominance of one party in an exchange relationship over another. The implication is that to better understand the rent-earning capability of any supply chain resource, the relative power attributes of both buyer and supplier must be understood. Specifically these rents are earnings in excess of the firm's costs of production that are not eroded in the long run by new market entrants. In economic terms, rents persist in long-run equilibrium while profits tend towards zero.},
 year = {2015}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Supply-Chain Coopetition
AU  - Hans W. Gottinger
Y1  - 2015/03/31
PY  - 2015
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20150402.16
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijber.20150402.16
T2  - International Journal of Business and Economics Research
JF  - International Journal of Business and Economics Research
JO  - International Journal of Business and Economics Research
SP  - 67
EP  - 71
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2328-756X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20150402.16
AB  - This paper addresses the power struggle among supply chain partners. It is asserted that when firms are collaborating to deliver value in the market; the creation of critical asset requires more than just monopoly ownership of supply of a resource over competitors. A critical asset can only be truly owned and/or controlled effectively to leverage value if there is a dominance of one party in an exchange relationship over another. The implication is that to better understand the rent-earning capability of any supply chain resource, the relative power attributes of both buyer and supplier must be understood. Specifically these rents are earnings in excess of the firm's costs of production that are not eroded in the long run by new market entrants. In economic terms, rents persist in long-run equilibrium while profits tend towards zero.
VL  - 4
IS  - 2
ER  -

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Author Information

Hans W. Gottinger

Strategy Technology Economics, STRATEC Consulting, Munich, Germany

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APA Style

Hans W. Gottinger. (2015). Supply-Chain Coopetition. International Journal of Business and Economics Research, 4(2), 67-71. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20150402.16

Copy | Download

ACS Style

Hans W. Gottinger. Supply-Chain Coopetition. Int. J. Bus. Econ. Res. 2015, 4(2), 67-71. doi: 10.11648/j.ijber.20150402.16

Copy | Download

AMA Style

Hans W. Gottinger. Supply-Chain Coopetition. Int J Bus Econ Res. 2015;4(2):67-71. doi: 10.11648/j.ijber.20150402.16

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@article{10.11648/j.ijber.20150402.16,
  author = {Hans W. Gottinger},
  title = {Supply-Chain Coopetition},
  journal = {International Journal of Business and Economics Research},
  volume = {4},
  number = {2},
  pages = {67-71},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijber.20150402.16},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20150402.16},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijber.20150402.16},
  abstract = {This paper addresses the power struggle among supply chain partners. It is asserted that when firms are collaborating to deliver value in the market; the creation of critical asset requires more than just monopoly ownership of supply of a resource over competitors. A critical asset can only be truly owned and/or controlled effectively to leverage value if there is a dominance of one party in an exchange relationship over another. The implication is that to better understand the rent-earning capability of any supply chain resource, the relative power attributes of both buyer and supplier must be understood. Specifically these rents are earnings in excess of the firm's costs of production that are not eroded in the long run by new market entrants. In economic terms, rents persist in long-run equilibrium while profits tend towards zero.},
 year = {2015}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Supply-Chain Coopetition
AU  - Hans W. Gottinger
Y1  - 2015/03/31
PY  - 2015
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20150402.16
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijber.20150402.16
T2  - International Journal of Business and Economics Research
JF  - International Journal of Business and Economics Research
JO  - International Journal of Business and Economics Research
SP  - 67
EP  - 71
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2328-756X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20150402.16
AB  - This paper addresses the power struggle among supply chain partners. It is asserted that when firms are collaborating to deliver value in the market; the creation of critical asset requires more than just monopoly ownership of supply of a resource over competitors. A critical asset can only be truly owned and/or controlled effectively to leverage value if there is a dominance of one party in an exchange relationship over another. The implication is that to better understand the rent-earning capability of any supply chain resource, the relative power attributes of both buyer and supplier must be understood. Specifically these rents are earnings in excess of the firm's costs of production that are not eroded in the long run by new market entrants. In economic terms, rents persist in long-run equilibrium while profits tend towards zero.
VL  - 4
IS  - 2
ER  -

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