An n-person double action game, i.e., an n-person strategy game, i.e., every player has and only has two actions, is a typical and useful game. It has been proved that in an n-person double game, every player’s two actions can be denoted by 0 and 1. An n-person double action game, i.e., every player’s action set is denoted as {0,1}, is said to be an n-person 0-1 game. In this paper, we first give a matrix representation of an n-person 0-1 game and then give a new and simpler algorithm to find all the (strictly) pure Nash equilibria for an n-person 0-1 game, called 0-1 tail algorithm. Specially, this algorithm can be simplified if the game is symmetrical. Some examples are given to show the algorithm.
| Published in | Mathematics and Computer Science (Volume 1, Issue 1) |
| DOI | 10.11648/j.mcs.20160101.12 |
| Page(s) | 5-9 |
| Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
| Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group |
n-person Double Action Game, n-person 0-1 Game, Symmetry, Matrix Representation, 0-1 Tail Algorithm, Symmetrical 3-person PD, Symmetrical 3-person Game of Rational Pigs
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APA Style
Dianyu Jiang. (2016). A Matrix Representation of an n-Person 0-1 Game and Its 0-1 Tail Algorithm to Find (Strictly) Pure Nash Equilibria. Mathematics and Computer Science, 1(1), 5-9. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.mcs.20160101.12
ACS Style
Dianyu Jiang. A Matrix Representation of an n-Person 0-1 Game and Its 0-1 Tail Algorithm to Find (Strictly) Pure Nash Equilibria. Math. Comput. Sci. 2016, 1(1), 5-9. doi: 10.11648/j.mcs.20160101.12
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Download@article{10.11648/j.mcs.20160101.12,
author = {Dianyu Jiang},
title = {A Matrix Representation of an n-Person 0-1 Game and Its 0-1 Tail Algorithm to Find (Strictly) Pure Nash Equilibria},
journal = {Mathematics and Computer Science},
volume = {1},
number = {1},
pages = {5-9},
doi = {10.11648/j.mcs.20160101.12},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.mcs.20160101.12},
eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.mcs.20160101.12},
abstract = {An n-person double action game, i.e., an n-person strategy game, i.e., every player has and only has two actions, is a typical and useful game. It has been proved that in an n-person double game, every player’s two actions can be denoted by 0 and 1. An n-person double action game, i.e., every player’s action set is denoted as {0,1}, is said to be an n-person 0-1 game. In this paper, we first give a matrix representation of an n-person 0-1 game and then give a new and simpler algorithm to find all the (strictly) pure Nash equilibria for an n-person 0-1 game, called 0-1 tail algorithm. Specially, this algorithm can be simplified if the game is symmetrical. Some examples are given to show the algorithm.},
year = {2016}
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - A Matrix Representation of an n-Person 0-1 Game and Its 0-1 Tail Algorithm to Find (Strictly) Pure Nash Equilibria
AU - Dianyu Jiang
Y1 - 2016/05/09
PY - 2016
N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.mcs.20160101.12
DO - 10.11648/j.mcs.20160101.12
T2 - Mathematics and Computer Science
JF - Mathematics and Computer Science
JO - Mathematics and Computer Science
SP - 5
EP - 9
PB - Science Publishing Group
SN - 2575-6028
UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.mcs.20160101.12
AB - An n-person double action game, i.e., an n-person strategy game, i.e., every player has and only has two actions, is a typical and useful game. It has been proved that in an n-person double game, every player’s two actions can be denoted by 0 and 1. An n-person double action game, i.e., every player’s action set is denoted as {0,1}, is said to be an n-person 0-1 game. In this paper, we first give a matrix representation of an n-person 0-1 game and then give a new and simpler algorithm to find all the (strictly) pure Nash equilibria for an n-person 0-1 game, called 0-1 tail algorithm. Specially, this algorithm can be simplified if the game is symmetrical. Some examples are given to show the algorithm.
VL - 1
IS - 1
ER -
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