The Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Audit Quality
International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume 5, Issue 4, August 2017, Pages: 87-91
Received: Mar. 24, 2017; Accepted: May 9, 2017; Published: Sep. 26, 2017
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Authors
Ghodratollah Talebnia, Faculty Member Science and Research Branch of Tehran, Islamic Azad University, Science and Research, Tehran, Iran
Fatemeh Baghiyan, Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute, Plasma Physics and Nuclear Fusion Research School, Azad University of Phd Unit International of Kish, Tehran, Iran
Zahra Baghiyan, Damavand Unit, Department of Azad University, Tehran, Iran
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Abstract
The purpose of public research this study was to analyze factors (competition and strategy) which influence or determine the governance structure of (SMF) and effectiveness of government agencies (improved performance and earnings quality by minimizing the likelihood of earnings management) in a theoretical and conceptual framework the official version by the structural equation modeling (SEM) is The specific objectives of this study: 1) implementation of actions and conceptual framework and development model to firms as a case study for images, practical research and discussion in this study developed and 2) analysis of the case study results and the relatively longer countries and studies to make a general conclusion contingency theory. However, it failed to provide any strong evidence on the relationship between corporate governance and performance. The findings show that It is dominated by an approach based on corporate ethics, corporate governance highlights the role of financial control.
Keywords
Audit Quality, Corporate Governance Mechanisms, External Auditor, Strategic Management, Management Performance
To cite this article
Ghodratollah Talebnia, Fatemeh Baghiyan, Zahra Baghiyan, The Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Audit Quality, International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. Vol. 5, No. 4, 2017, pp. 87-91. doi: 10.11648/j.ijebo.20170504.11
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 Authors retain the copyright of this article.
This article is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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