Fiscal Decentralization and Corruption in Emerging and Developing Countries
International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
Volume 4, Issue 4, August 2016, Pages: 211-222
Received: Jul. 3, 2016; Accepted: Jul. 18, 2016; Published: Aug. 6, 2016
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Miri Meriem, Faculty of Economics, Abdelmalek Essaadi University, Tangier, Morocco
Taacha El Hassan, Faculty of Economics, Abdelmalek Essaadi University, Tangier, Morocco
Benatia Mohamed Ayman, Faculty of Economics, Kadi Ayad University, Marrakech, Morocco
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This study focuses on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and ICRG index of corruption risk in both categories of emerging and developing countries, using a sample of 38 countries for the period 2000-2014. The aim is to focus on expenditure and revenue decentralization giving importance to the effects of subnational revenue mobilization on this correlation as: Tax revenue, Non tax revenue and fiscal imbalances. The study shows a significant and robust correlation between expenditure decentralization and the index of corruption: expenditure decentralization tends to reduce the risk of corruption in these two categories of countries. The impact of Tax Revenue is as important in this relationship as it helps reduce the risk even more. While revenue decentralization and especially non-tax revenue has no significant relationship with the index.
Fiscal Decentralization, Corruption, Developing Countries, Emerging Countries
To cite this article
Miri Meriem, Taacha El Hassan, Benatia Mohamed Ayman, Fiscal Decentralization and Corruption in Emerging and Developing Countries, International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences. Vol. 4, No. 4, 2016, pp. 211-222. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20160404.17
Copyright © 2016 Authors retain the copyright of this article.
This article is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License ( which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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