Study on the Problems of Management Shareholding and the Mixed Ownership
International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
Volume 5, Issue 6, December 2017, Pages: 304-311
Received: Nov. 16, 2017; Published: Nov. 20, 2017
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Authors
Gao Li, International Business School, Tianjin Foreign Studies University, Tianjin, China
Song Shanshan, International Business School, Tianjin Foreign Studies University, Tianjin, China
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Abstract
In recent years, managerial ownership has begun to be used as an incentive mechanism in China. Managerial ownership is one of the ways to realize the mixed ownership reform of state owned enterprises. In this paper, the impact of executive stock ownership on corporate performance of China's state-owned listed companies that mixed ownership has been achieved is analyzed. The conclusions are as follows: the state-owned listed companies management ownership and corporate performance has a positive correlation. The financial performance of the company increases with the proportion of management shareholding, ownership concentration and equity balance. There is a significant negative correlation between the proportion of independent directors and the rate of return on net assets, which shows that the independent directors of state-owned enterprises in China have not played its due role in the governance of state-owned enterprises.
Keywords
State-Owned Enterprises, Mixed Ownership, Managerial Ownership, Corporate Performance
To cite this article
Gao Li, Song Shanshan, Study on the Problems of Management Shareholding and the Mixed Ownership, International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences. Vol. 5, No. 6, 2017, pp. 304-311. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20170506.15
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