The Impact of Intrahousehold Resource Distribution on Woman’s Bargaining Power – A Collective Model Approach
International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
Volume 6, Issue 1, February 2018, Pages: 27-34
Received: Jan. 30, 2018; Accepted: Feb. 16, 2018; Published: Mar. 16, 2018
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Authors
Syed Ali, Department of Economics, Mulungushi University, Kabwe, Zambia
Bupe Simuchimba, Department of Economics, Mulungushi University, Kabwe, Zambia
Christabel Ngongola, Department of Economics, Mulungushi University, Kabwe, Zambia
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Abstract
This study was conducted in Kabwe city of Zambia during June to august 2017. The city was divided in to three zones – more developed, medium developed and backward. From each zone one area, i.e., Highridge, Katundo and Makululu, respectively, was selected. The purpose of study was to know the impact of intra-household resource distribution on woman’s bargaining power. Logit model was used to find out the relationship between dependent and independent variables. The study revealed positive impact of age and education on bargaining power of woman in the household. Asset ownership also had significant impact on the bargaining power of woman. The study recommended to constitute a new higher education policy to encourage women to pursue higher education and to reduce drop-outs. It is also recommended that the women should be made owners of assets in the household through legislation.
Keywords
Bargaining Power, Education, Ownership of Assets, Gender-Based Violence, Autonomy to Travel Alone, Intra-Household Resource Allocation, Policy Intervention
To cite this article
Syed Ali, Bupe Simuchimba, Christabel Ngongola, The Impact of Intrahousehold Resource Distribution on Woman’s Bargaining Power – A Collective Model Approach, International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences. Vol. 6, No. 1, 2018, pp. 27-34. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20180601.15
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 Authors retain the copyright of this article.
This article is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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