Routines and Incentives, and Their Influence on Compliance with the Doctrinal Principles of Fisheries Cooperatives

Ana Laura Bojorquez Carrillo; Victor Manuel Villasuso Pino; Idalia Amparo de los Santos Briones

doi:doi:10.11648/j.ijefm.20200803.14

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Routines and Incentives, and Their Influence on Compliance with the Doctrinal Principles of Fisheries Cooperatives

Ana Laura Bojorquez Carrillo, Victor Manuel Villasuso Pino, Idalia Amparo de los Santos Briones

Published in International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences (Volume 8, Issue 3)

Received: 16 July 2018 Accepted: 8 August 2018 Published: 17 June 2020

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Abstract

Fisheries cooperatives play an important role in Mexico, given that they are capable of generating employment, supplying food, stimulating local commerce, and promoting democracy and social integration in the communities where they operate. Fisheries production cooperatives form part of a sector called the social economy. Nevertheless, like all organizations, they face problems in terms of management, worker relations, rule implementation, and continuance over time. The aim of this study is to analyze and identify the degree of influence that exists between the informal constraints of fisheries production cooperatives (specifically in the form of institutional routines and incentives) and compliance with their doctrinal principles. This study uses a non-experimental quantitative, cross-sectional, correlational-explanatory approach. The research methods consisted of the construction of associated indices, descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and multiple linear regression analysis. Three hypotheses were proposed. With regard to H1, the results showed that informal constraints in the form of routines are moderately correlated with the level of compliance with the formal rules. Regarding the results for H2, it was confirmed that informal constraints in the form of incentives are very weakly correlated with the level of compliance with the formal rules. And with regard to H3, based on a joint analysis of the variables, only routines significantly influenced compliance with these doctrinal principles. Based on the above, it was concluded that routines and not incentives are the factors that exert the greatest influence on compliance with the doctrinal principles of cooperatives.

Published in	International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences (Volume 8, Issue 3)
DOI	10.11648/j.ijefm.20200803.14
Page(s)	112-121
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Local Development, Cooperatives, Formal Rules, Informal Constraints, Institutionalism

References

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[2]	Alianza Coperativa Internacional. (2015). Las cooperativas y los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible. Bruselas: Alianza Coperativa Internacional. Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT), p. 2.
[3]	North, D. C. (1995). Instituciones, cambio institucional y desempeño económico. Mèxico: Fondo de la Cultura Económica.
[4]	Dimaggio, W., & Powell, P. (1999). El nuevo institucionalismo en el análisis organizacional. Mexico: Fondo de la cultura económica.
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[6]	Aguilar Juárez, I. P. (2014). Estadística descriptiva. México: Universidad Autónoma de México, p. 1.
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[8]	Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía. (2014). INEGI. Obtenido de Cuentame - Información por entidad: http://cuentame.inegi.org.mx/monografias/informacion/Yuc/Economia/default.aspx?tema=ME&e=31#sp.
[9]	Selznick, P. (1969). Fundamentos de la teoria de la organizacion. Bogotá, Colombia: Instituto Interamericano de Ciencias Agrícolas OEA.
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[11]	Bojórquez Carrillo, A. L. (2011). Instituciones y Autonomía Municipal en México. Incentivos institucionales para la Autonomía Fiscal de los Municipios de Yucatán. Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Instituto Universitario de Investigación Ortega y Gasset.
[12]	Knight, J. (1992). Institutions and Social Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[13]	Shepsle, K. (1989). Study Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choise Approach. Journal of Theoritical Politics, 1 (2), 131-149.
[14]	Merino, M. (2005). La importancia de las rutinas. México: Centro de Investigación y docencia económicas.
[15]	Jaén, M., & Paravisin, D. (1999). Diseño institucional, estructura de incentivos y corrupción en hospitales públicos en Venezuela. Washintong, D. C.: Inter-American Development Bank, p. 8.
[16]	Zapata Rotundo, G. y Hernández Arias, A. (2010). Sistema de incentivos y tipos básicos de trabajo en la organización bajo la perspectiva de la teoría de agencia. Pensamiento y Gestión, 29, 56-86.
[17]	Leal Millán, A. P. (1999). El factor humano en las relaciones laborales. Madrid: Pirámide.
[18]	Ley General de Sociedades Cooperativas de 1994. [Versión en línea]. Recuperado de http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/lgsc.htm.
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APA Style

Ana Laura Bojorquez Carrillo, Victor Manuel Villasuso Pino, Idalia Amparo de los Santos Briones. (2020). Routines and Incentives, and Their Influence on Compliance with the Doctrinal Principles of Fisheries Cooperatives. International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences, 8(3), 112-121. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20200803.14

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ACS Style

Ana Laura Bojorquez Carrillo; Victor Manuel Villasuso Pino; Idalia Amparo de los Santos Briones. Routines and Incentives, and Their Influence on Compliance with the Doctrinal Principles of Fisheries Cooperatives. Int. J. Econ. Finance Manag. Sci. 2020, 8(3), 112-121. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20200803.14

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AMA Style

Ana Laura Bojorquez Carrillo, Victor Manuel Villasuso Pino, Idalia Amparo de los Santos Briones. Routines and Incentives, and Their Influence on Compliance with the Doctrinal Principles of Fisheries Cooperatives. Int J Econ Finance Manag Sci. 2020;8(3):112-121. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20200803.14

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@article{10.11648/j.ijefm.20200803.14,
  author = {Ana Laura Bojorquez Carrillo and Victor Manuel Villasuso Pino and Idalia Amparo de los Santos Briones},
  title = {Routines and Incentives, and Their Influence on Compliance with the Doctrinal Principles of Fisheries Cooperatives},
  journal = {International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences},
  volume = {8},
  number = {3},
  pages = {112-121},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijefm.20200803.14},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20200803.14},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijefm.20200803.14},
  abstract = {Fisheries cooperatives play an important role in Mexico, given that they are capable of generating employment, supplying food, stimulating local commerce, and promoting democracy and social integration in the communities where they operate. Fisheries production cooperatives form part of a sector called the social economy. Nevertheless, like all organizations, they face problems in terms of management, worker relations, rule implementation, and continuance over time. The aim of this study is to analyze and identify the degree of influence that exists between the informal constraints of fisheries production cooperatives (specifically in the form of institutional routines and incentives) and compliance with their doctrinal principles. This study uses a non-experimental quantitative, cross-sectional, correlational-explanatory approach. The research methods consisted of the construction of associated indices, descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and multiple linear regression analysis. Three hypotheses were proposed. With regard to H1, the results showed that informal constraints in the form of routines are moderately correlated with the level of compliance with the formal rules. Regarding the results for H2, it was confirmed that informal constraints in the form of incentives are very weakly correlated with the level of compliance with the formal rules. And with regard to H3, based on a joint analysis of the variables, only routines significantly influenced compliance with these doctrinal principles. Based on the above, it was concluded that routines and not incentives are the factors that exert the greatest influence on compliance with the doctrinal principles of cooperatives.},
 year = {2020}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Routines and Incentives, and Their Influence on Compliance with the Doctrinal Principles of Fisheries Cooperatives
AU  - Ana Laura Bojorquez Carrillo
AU  - Victor Manuel Villasuso Pino
AU  - Idalia Amparo de los Santos Briones
Y1  - 2020/06/17
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DO  - 10.11648/j.ijefm.20200803.14
T2  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
JF  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
JO  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
SP  - 112
EP  - 121
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2326-9561
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20200803.14
AB  - Fisheries cooperatives play an important role in Mexico, given that they are capable of generating employment, supplying food, stimulating local commerce, and promoting democracy and social integration in the communities where they operate. Fisheries production cooperatives form part of a sector called the social economy. Nevertheless, like all organizations, they face problems in terms of management, worker relations, rule implementation, and continuance over time. The aim of this study is to analyze and identify the degree of influence that exists between the informal constraints of fisheries production cooperatives (specifically in the form of institutional routines and incentives) and compliance with their doctrinal principles. This study uses a non-experimental quantitative, cross-sectional, correlational-explanatory approach. The research methods consisted of the construction of associated indices, descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and multiple linear regression analysis. Three hypotheses were proposed. With regard to H1, the results showed that informal constraints in the form of routines are moderately correlated with the level of compliance with the formal rules. Regarding the results for H2, it was confirmed that informal constraints in the form of incentives are very weakly correlated with the level of compliance with the formal rules. And with regard to H3, based on a joint analysis of the variables, only routines significantly influenced compliance with these doctrinal principles. Based on the above, it was concluded that routines and not incentives are the factors that exert the greatest influence on compliance with the doctrinal principles of cooperatives.
VL  - 8
IS  - 3
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Author Information

Ana Laura Bojorquez Carrillo

Faculty of Accounting and Administration, Autonomous University of Yucatan, Merida, Mexico
Victor Manuel Villasuso Pino

Faculty of Accounting and Administration, Autonomous University of Yucatan, Merida, Mexico
Idalia Amparo de los Santos Briones

Faculty of Accounting and Administration, Autonomous University of Yucatan, Merida, Mexico

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APA Style

Ana Laura Bojorquez Carrillo, Victor Manuel Villasuso Pino, Idalia Amparo de los Santos Briones. (2020). Routines and Incentives, and Their Influence on Compliance with the Doctrinal Principles of Fisheries Cooperatives. International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences, 8(3), 112-121. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20200803.14

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ACS Style

Ana Laura Bojorquez Carrillo; Victor Manuel Villasuso Pino; Idalia Amparo de los Santos Briones. Routines and Incentives, and Their Influence on Compliance with the Doctrinal Principles of Fisheries Cooperatives. Int. J. Econ. Finance Manag. Sci. 2020, 8(3), 112-121. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20200803.14

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AMA Style

Ana Laura Bojorquez Carrillo, Victor Manuel Villasuso Pino, Idalia Amparo de los Santos Briones. Routines and Incentives, and Their Influence on Compliance with the Doctrinal Principles of Fisheries Cooperatives. Int J Econ Finance Manag Sci. 2020;8(3):112-121. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20200803.14

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@article{10.11648/j.ijefm.20200803.14,
  author = {Ana Laura Bojorquez Carrillo and Victor Manuel Villasuso Pino and Idalia Amparo de los Santos Briones},
  title = {Routines and Incentives, and Their Influence on Compliance with the Doctrinal Principles of Fisheries Cooperatives},
  journal = {International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences},
  volume = {8},
  number = {3},
  pages = {112-121},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijefm.20200803.14},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20200803.14},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijefm.20200803.14},
  abstract = {Fisheries cooperatives play an important role in Mexico, given that they are capable of generating employment, supplying food, stimulating local commerce, and promoting democracy and social integration in the communities where they operate. Fisheries production cooperatives form part of a sector called the social economy. Nevertheless, like all organizations, they face problems in terms of management, worker relations, rule implementation, and continuance over time. The aim of this study is to analyze and identify the degree of influence that exists between the informal constraints of fisheries production cooperatives (specifically in the form of institutional routines and incentives) and compliance with their doctrinal principles. This study uses a non-experimental quantitative, cross-sectional, correlational-explanatory approach. The research methods consisted of the construction of associated indices, descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and multiple linear regression analysis. Three hypotheses were proposed. With regard to H1, the results showed that informal constraints in the form of routines are moderately correlated with the level of compliance with the formal rules. Regarding the results for H2, it was confirmed that informal constraints in the form of incentives are very weakly correlated with the level of compliance with the formal rules. And with regard to H3, based on a joint analysis of the variables, only routines significantly influenced compliance with these doctrinal principles. Based on the above, it was concluded that routines and not incentives are the factors that exert the greatest influence on compliance with the doctrinal principles of cooperatives.},
 year = {2020}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Routines and Incentives, and Their Influence on Compliance with the Doctrinal Principles of Fisheries Cooperatives
AU  - Ana Laura Bojorquez Carrillo
AU  - Victor Manuel Villasuso Pino
AU  - Idalia Amparo de los Santos Briones
Y1  - 2020/06/17
PY  - 2020
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20200803.14
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijefm.20200803.14
T2  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
JF  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
JO  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
SP  - 112
EP  - 121
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2326-9561
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20200803.14
AB  - Fisheries cooperatives play an important role in Mexico, given that they are capable of generating employment, supplying food, stimulating local commerce, and promoting democracy and social integration in the communities where they operate. Fisheries production cooperatives form part of a sector called the social economy. Nevertheless, like all organizations, they face problems in terms of management, worker relations, rule implementation, and continuance over time. The aim of this study is to analyze and identify the degree of influence that exists between the informal constraints of fisheries production cooperatives (specifically in the form of institutional routines and incentives) and compliance with their doctrinal principles. This study uses a non-experimental quantitative, cross-sectional, correlational-explanatory approach. The research methods consisted of the construction of associated indices, descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and multiple linear regression analysis. Three hypotheses were proposed. With regard to H1, the results showed that informal constraints in the form of routines are moderately correlated with the level of compliance with the formal rules. Regarding the results for H2, it was confirmed that informal constraints in the form of incentives are very weakly correlated with the level of compliance with the formal rules. And with regard to H3, based on a joint analysis of the variables, only routines significantly influenced compliance with these doctrinal principles. Based on the above, it was concluded that routines and not incentives are the factors that exert the greatest influence on compliance with the doctrinal principles of cooperatives.
VL  - 8
IS  - 3
ER  -

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