Evolutionary Game Analysis of Campus Credit Strategy Selection Under Incomplete Information Conditions
Journal of World Economic Research
Volume 9, Issue 1, June 2020, Pages: 61-67
Received: Jan. 9, 2020; Accepted: Jan. 31, 2020; Published: Feb. 10, 2020
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Guoshun Ma, College of Mathematics and Statistics, Northwest Normal University, Lanzhou, China
Chonghui Ma, College of Mathematics and Statistics, Northwest Normal University, Lanzhou, China
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Since the China Banking Regulatory Commission issued relevant policies on standardizing the credit card business of college students in 2009, college students' credit cards have gradually withdrawn from campus loan business. In recent years, with the rapid development of the Internet, "Online campus loan" began to take the college student market as the goal, and quickly entered the university campus through recruiting student cadres to carry out "carpet" promotion activities inside the campus. And seized the current situation of college students' lack of financial knowledge and the psychology of comparative consumption, the business volume expands rapidly. The subsequent malignant events, such as "10g naked loan slip", "huge profits and fund-raising", "some college students jumping off buildings to commit suicide due to their inability to repay the loan", also have a negative impact on the society. In view of the above phenomena, this article combines existing research on existing problems of campus loans, and establishes an evolutionary game model between the campus online loan platform and college student borrowers from the perspective of evolutionary games. The game model has two stable points (1, 1), (0, 0), namely, the campus loan platform chooses to deceive the borrower, the borrower chooses to break the trust, and the campus loan platform chooses not to deceive the borrower, and the borrower keeps the trust. This paper discusses the influence of the changes of the relevant parameters in the model on the choice of the game strategy, and puts forward some suggestions to establish a two-way scoring mechanism for online lending, increase the financial knowledge reserve and income of college students, and help them establish a correct consumption view to standardize the campus online lending work.
Campus Online Loan, Evolutionary Game, Replication Dynamic Equation, Evolutionary Stability Strategy
To cite this article
Guoshun Ma, Chonghui Ma, Evolutionary Game Analysis of Campus Credit Strategy Selection Under Incomplete Information Conditions, Journal of World Economic Research. Vol. 9, No. 1, 2020, pp. 61-67. doi: 10.11648/j.jwer.20200901.18
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