An Analysis of Dual Class Equity System - Taking Vanke as an Example
Volume 6, Issue 4, August 2017, Pages: 44-47
Received: Mar. 22, 2017;
Accepted: Jun. 30, 2017;
Published: Aug. 11, 2017
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Gu Yu, Department of Accounting, Beijing Wuzi University, Beijing, China
Wang Boyu, Department of Accounting, Beijing Wuzi University, Beijing, China
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The acquisition of Vanke Company by Baoneng group has aroused discussions between the theoretical circle and the real world on the dual class equity system. The development of multi-level ownership structure is a challenge and an opportunity for China's capital market. To research the dual class equity system in the angle of top-level design, we ought to make a change in giving the high-tech, high hit, and blue chip companies the choice of ownership structure in order to adapt the fierce competition environment. the dual class equity system reform level include the strict standards, regulate the entry criteria; strict rules of information disclosure mechanism, guarantee transparency of information and fair environment; defining the subject of management, improve the protection of small investors interest mechanism. We should make a useful exploration of the dual ownership system and continuously promote the reform of the shareholding structure in China.
Ownership Structure, Dual Class Equity System, Vanke
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An Analysis of Dual Class Equity System - Taking Vanke as an Example, Economics.
Vol. 6, No. 4,
2017, pp. 44-47.
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