Supply-Chain Coopetition
International Journal of Business and Economics Research
Volume 4, Issue 2, April 2015, Pages: 67-71
Received: Jan. 24, 2015; Accepted: Feb. 9, 2015; Published: Mar. 31, 2015
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Author
Hans W. Gottinger, Strategy Technology Economics, STRATEC Consulting, Munich, Germany
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Abstract
This paper addresses the power struggle among supply chain partners. It is asserted that when firms are collaborating to deliver value in the market; the creation of critical asset requires more than just monopoly ownership of supply of a resource over competitors. A critical asset can only be truly owned and/or controlled effectively to leverage value if there is a dominance of one party in an exchange relationship over another. The implication is that to better understand the rent-earning capability of any supply chain resource, the relative power attributes of both buyer and supplier must be understood. Specifically these rents are earnings in excess of the firm's costs of production that are not eroded in the long run by new market entrants. In economic terms, rents persist in long-run equilibrium while profits tend towards zero.
Keywords
Supply Chain, Outsourcing, Coopetition, Investment Strategy, Stochastic Games
To cite this article
Hans W. Gottinger, Supply-Chain Coopetition, International Journal of Business and Economics Research. Vol. 4, No. 2, 2015, pp. 67-71. doi: 10.11648/j.ijber.20150402.16
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