The Research of PPP Model Under Better Service Framework
Social Sciences
Volume 7, Issue 3, June 2018, Pages: 141-145
Received: Jun. 19, 2018; Published: Jun. 20, 2018
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Authors
Xianmei Xu, The School of Public Finance and Taxation, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, P. R. China
Ke Gao, The School of Public Finance and Taxation, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, P. R. China
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Abstract
Quantitative analysis of the monopoly index and efficiency of three industries of public service was carried out with SCP model, and the questions that why the government does not monopolize the public service market and whether private departments can provide efficient public service were answered. Moreover, social welfare function of two classes was established, which provides theoretical support for PPP model from the demand side. Efficiency source of P1 + P2 was analyzed with Nash equilibrium and economics of scope, and it was concluded that the ultimate of PPP isa kind of Nash equilibrium.
Keywords
ISCP Model, Nash Equilibrium, Economics of Scope, Social Welfare Function
To cite this article
Xianmei Xu, Ke Gao, The Research of PPP Model Under Better Service Framework, Social Sciences. Vol. 7, No. 3, 2018, pp. 141-145. doi: 10.11648/j.ss.20180703.15
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