Heuristics of Self-Consciousness between Theory of Mind and Intentionality
American Journal of Applied Psychology
Volume 4, Issue 3, May 2015, Pages: 50-54
Received: Apr. 8, 2015; Accepted: Apr. 11, 2015; Published: Apr. 22, 2015
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Author
Cristina-Georgiana Voicu, Romanian Academy, Iaşi, Romania
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Abstract
This article starts from the interpretation of subjective experience and narrative hermeneutics, suggesting a cognitive re-evaluation of egotic intentionality from the “first-person perspective” and showing together the conjunction between phenomenology and cognitivism (the egotic self). The article also addresses the phenomenal consciousness according to D. Dennett’s theory of intentionality. In an attempt to highlight the reflected self as a form of consciousness, the work seeks the continuous updating of the divided self (hyphenated self) and the discovery of a new hybrid self by intercommunication and the awareness of self through “us”. Based on the theory of mind, the fluctuations of self and subjectivity aim at revealing the self existence. However, by the need to rethink the self position in relation to the hyper-reality of the mental metabolism, this article explores self-awareness as a new form of intentional dynamics / intentionality.
Keywords
Mind, Phenomenal Intentionality, Self-Consciousness, Subjectivity, Heuristics
To cite this article
Cristina-Georgiana Voicu, Heuristics of Self-Consciousness between Theory of Mind and Intentionality, American Journal of Applied Psychology. Vol. 4, No. 3, 2015, pp. 50-54. doi: 10.11648/j.ajap.20150403.11
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