International Journal of Philosophy

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On Perception and Some Consequences: The World, the Brain and Infinity

Received: 17 November 2014    Accepted: 25 November 2014    Published: 28 November 2014
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Abstract

This paper presents a new type of perception that consists of adding something to the sensory data that is not present in any of the brain states or in sensory data of the past or present, not even implicitly. This capacity to create structural novelty, which is called ‘completion’ done by the open brain, is the key to resolving many epistemological problems (paradoxes of knowledge). Combined with real infinity in the world, it gives, together with incommensurability and intentionality, a clear account of objectivity, conceptualization, free will and other problematic issues. We call this ‘objective multi-relativism,’ allowing several incommensurable truths referring to an identical invariance in reality. Finally, good faith and bad faith are introduced as epistemological principles, which are the driving forces that allow us to agree or not on something incommensurable. This is not a theory of knowledge but just a logical study of what would happen to the above issues if the different considered forms of infinity were the case.

DOI 10.11648/j.ijp.20140205.11
Published in International Journal of Philosophy (Volume 2, Issue 5, October 2014)
Page(s) 60-71
Creative Commons

This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.

Copyright

Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Paradox, Perception, Infinity, Incommensurability, Intentionality, Completion, Open Brain, Good Faith, Bad Faith

References
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    Alfred Abächerli. (2014). On Perception and Some Consequences: The World, the Brain and Infinity. International Journal of Philosophy, 2(5), 60-71. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20140205.11

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    Alfred Abächerli. On Perception and Some Consequences: The World, the Brain and Infinity. Int. J. Philos. 2014, 2(5), 60-71. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20140205.11

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    AMA Style

    Alfred Abächerli. On Perception and Some Consequences: The World, the Brain and Infinity. Int J Philos. 2014;2(5):60-71. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20140205.11

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  • @article{10.11648/j.ijp.20140205.11,
      author = {Alfred Abächerli},
      title = {On Perception and Some Consequences: The World, the Brain and Infinity},
      journal = {International Journal of Philosophy},
      volume = {2},
      number = {5},
      pages = {60-71},
      doi = {10.11648/j.ijp.20140205.11},
      url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20140205.11},
      eprint = {https://download.sciencepg.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijp.20140205.11},
      abstract = {This paper presents a new type of perception that consists of adding something to the sensory data that is not present in any of the brain states or in sensory data of the past or present, not even implicitly. This capacity to create structural novelty, which is called ‘completion’ done by the open brain, is the key to resolving many epistemological problems (paradoxes of knowledge). Combined with real infinity in the world, it gives, together with incommensurability and intentionality, a clear account of objectivity, conceptualization, free will and other problematic issues. We call this ‘objective multi-relativism,’ allowing several incommensurable truths referring to an identical invariance in reality. Finally, good faith and bad faith are introduced as epistemological principles, which are the driving forces that allow us to agree or not on something incommensurable. This is not a theory of knowledge but just a logical study of what would happen to the above issues if the different considered forms of infinity were the case.},
     year = {2014}
    }
    

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    AB  - This paper presents a new type of perception that consists of adding something to the sensory data that is not present in any of the brain states or in sensory data of the past or present, not even implicitly. This capacity to create structural novelty, which is called ‘completion’ done by the open brain, is the key to resolving many epistemological problems (paradoxes of knowledge). Combined with real infinity in the world, it gives, together with incommensurability and intentionality, a clear account of objectivity, conceptualization, free will and other problematic issues. We call this ‘objective multi-relativism,’ allowing several incommensurable truths referring to an identical invariance in reality. Finally, good faith and bad faith are introduced as epistemological principles, which are the driving forces that allow us to agree or not on something incommensurable. This is not a theory of knowledge but just a logical study of what would happen to the above issues if the different considered forms of infinity were the case.
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