Four Theses About Qualia and Matter: From Quality to Structure, from Structure to Functions
International Journal of Philosophy
Volume 5, Issue 3, June 2017, Pages: 23-29
Received: Apr. 2, 2017;
Accepted: Apr. 18, 2017;
Published: Jun. 1, 2017
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Aleksandr Vladimirovich Zhuravlev, Neurogenetics Laboratory, Pavlov Institute of Physiology, Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg, Russia
The mind-body problem is considered here in terms of quality and structure, which are believed to be intimately related. Both qualia, the elements of phenomenal consciousness, and their material causes possess specific structure of inner relations founded by their qualitative nature. This seems to define their functions in the process of cognition. Qualia are intrinsically organized as a complex multifold system, where the general relations, forms, and properties are represented as quasi-separated phenomena. Reflected by the structure of the brain physical processes, they may assist to conceive the general laws and regularities of nature, thereby helping a subject to optimize his behavioral strategy.
Aleksandr Vladimirovich Zhuravlev,
Four Theses About Qualia and Matter: From Quality to Structure, from Structure to Functions, International Journal of Philosophy.
Vol. 5, No. 3,
2017, pp. 23-29.
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