Using Sensemaking Technique to Construct Scientific Explanations in Organizational Research
International Journal of Philosophy
Volume 7, Issue 4, December 2019, Pages: 167-172
Received: Oct. 3, 2019; Accepted: Oct. 26, 2019; Published: Dec. 12, 2019
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Author
Everest Turyahikayo, Department of Public Administration and Management, Uganda Management Institute, Kampala, Uganda
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Abstract
In the philosophy of science, an impression is created that scientific explanations are perhaps a preserve of physical and natural sciences. Although social scientists in organizational research have borrowed most modals of scientific explanations from natural scientists, they have met harsh criticism from their counterparts in the natural and physical sciences. This paper set out to explain how scientific explanations can be constructed successfully in organizational studies using modals borrowed from natural sciences. Basing on the critical literature review, the paper has successfully argued that, organizational research applies models of scientific explanations using sense making. In the case of the covering law model, it has been argued that the model connects well with sense making in organizational research in many respects since sense making recognizes explanandum in terms of organizational events that people experience in everyday life. The paper has also indicated that in the statistical-probabilistic model explanations are based on non-deductive reasoning and make it hard for the researcher to predict the explanandum with certainty except with some degree of probability. This applies in both organizational studies as well as in natural sciences. Like in the statistical probability model, causal-effect relationships can also be demonstrated statistically in organizational research. Moreover, the fact that organizational researchers have different traditions from those of ‘number crunchers’ does not make such traditions inferior. Lastly, the unification model portrays scientific explanations as constructed in a unified design. The paper has shown that in organizational research, unification manifests quite differently from the natural sciences. Organizations operate in unstable condition in the sense that there are so many disciplines under organizational research.
Keywords
Philosophy, Scientific Explanation, Sense Making, Organizational Research
To cite this article
Everest Turyahikayo, Using Sensemaking Technique to Construct Scientific Explanations in Organizational Research, International Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 7, No. 4, 2019, pp. 167-172. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20190704.15
Copyright
Copyright © 2019 Authors retain the copyright of this article.
This article is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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