The Rationality of the Process of Theory Change in Science
International Journal of Philosophy
Volume 8, Issue 2, June 2020, Pages: 49-53
Received: Aug. 27, 2019;
Accepted: Oct. 23, 2019;
Published: Jun. 17, 2020
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Bisrat Tesfay, Department of Civics & Ethical Education, Wolaita Sodo University, Wolaita Sodo, Ethiopia
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This article gives an ephemeral overview of the most influential views on the nature and process of change in science. Theory change in science is one of the most important issues in philosophy of science. Scientific theories are subject to change beyond space and time. There are various factors that lead theories change such as discomfort among the theories. In this paper, discussing how the rationality of science was related with its methods and methodologies, I tried to show that it was after Kuhn’s work the Structure of Scientific Revolutions that the debate on theory choice becomes a central issue in philosophy of science. Following this the process in theory change in science can be deductive and inductive or rational and non-rational. According to the account of Kuhn’s scientific change there are four steps in the process of scientific change; the predominant one is normal science, anomalies, crisis and finally a new phase of normal science. Then I discussed some of the philosophers who criticize Kuhn’s work Structure of Scientific Revolutions, particularly popper’s criticism on Kuhn; in this regard I also forwarded Kuhn’s response for his critics. Finally I critically compared Kuhn’s and Popper’s ideas on the evolution of science.
Falsification, Verification, Scientific Revolutions, Paradigm, Normal Science, Rational Change
To cite this article
The Rationality of the Process of Theory Change in Science, International Journal of Philosophy.
Vol. 8, No. 2,
2020, pp. 49-53.
Copyright © 2020 Authors retain the copyright of this article.
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