Is Science Rational: Critical Analysis on Thomas Kuhn’s Objectivity, Value Judgment and Theory Choice and Harvey Siegel’s Inquiry Concerning the Rationality of Science
International Journal of Philosophy
Volume 8, Issue 3, September 2020, Pages: 61-67
Received: May 27, 2020;
Accepted: Jun. 22, 2020;
Published: Jul. 30, 2020
Views 115 Downloads 70
Abdeta Mamo Hiko, Department of Civics and Ethical Studies, Madda Walabu University, Bale, Robe, Ethiopia
Is science rational is the central concern of this paper. The paper mainly examines the wisdom of science based on Thomas Kuhn objectivity, value judgment and theory choice and Harvey Siegel’s examination about the rationality of science. In doing so for Kuhn, the central argument of scientific rationality is reasonableness and logicality in justification and to be reasonable and logically justifiable for what we do. What ensures that science is rational is the dedication to evidence. It also explores Siegel’s concept of scientific method and his justification of the received view of science. Thus, I employed philosophical method of analysis and phenomenology. This paper maintains that choosing rational activity of our reason for the rival theories is not determined by universal standard. I thus, suggested that his rationality of science as lack of objective reasons for why scientists should favour one theory over another. Instead, my main argument Kuhn rationality of science in his five criterion of theory choice is imprecise. Because, this standard restrict one’s which is theory choices are not sufficient to persuade or clearly to confirm the choice of one paradigm over the other. Thus, I deffend the position that no rational justification outside paradigm and I argues, against a kind of rationality with which science should be identified and proceeds in agreement.
Abdeta Mamo Hiko,
Is Science Rational: Critical Analysis on Thomas Kuhn’s Objectivity, Value Judgment and Theory Choice and Harvey Siegel’s Inquiry Concerning the Rationality of Science, International Journal of Philosophy.
Vol. 8, No. 3,
2020, pp. 61-67.
Copyright © 2020 Authors retain the copyright of this article.
This article is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Sebastian de H. (2019), Science and Philosophy: A Love-Hate Relationship. Cambridge University Press
Wogu, I. (2016), A Critical Analysis of Karl Popper’s Verisimilitude Thesis and the Hallmark of Science. International Journal of Contemporary Applied Sciences Vol. 3, No. 8, August 2016 (ISSN: 2308-1365) www.ijcas.net 14
Thagard, P. (2004). Rationality and science. In A. Mele & P. Rawlings (Eds.), Handbook of rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (pp. 363-379).
Goldman, A. (1999). Knowledge in a social world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Godfrey-Smith, Peter (2003) Theory and Reality: an Introduction to Philosophy of Science, Chicago and London, the University of Chicago Press
Kuhn, T. (1977) “Objectivity, Value Judgment and Theory Choice” in Marc Lange(ed.), Philosophy of Science; An Anthology. Blackwell Publishing
Kuhn, T. S. (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolution, 2ndEd, London: Chicago University Press
Salmon. W. (1983) “Carl G. Hempel on the Rationality of Science” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 80, No. 10, Part 1: Eightieth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Divisionpp. 555-562
Siegel, H. (1985) “What Is the Question Concerning the Rationality of Science” in Philosophy of Science. JSTOR: Vol. 52, No. 4, PP. 517-537. University of Chicago Press, available on.
Hempel, C. G. (1965). Aspects of scientific explanation. New York: The Free Press
Zamora Bonilla J. P., (2010), “What games do scientists play? Rationality, objectivity, and the social construction of scientific knowledge”, EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association, ed. M. Suárez, Springer, Amsterdam, pp. 323–332.
Dusek, V. (2006) Philosophy of Science and Technology. Black Well Publishing.
Jennifer K. Uleman 2010, An Introduction to Kant’s Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press
Psillos, S. (1999). Scientific realism: How science tracks the truth. London: Routledge.
Klayman, J., & Ha, Y. (1987). Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing. Psychological Review, 94, 211-228.
Popper, K. (2002) Conjectures and Refutations, (Routledge & Kegan Paul New York).
Kenaw, Setargew (PhD), (2015) Unpublished Lecture Notes on philosophy of science: Addis Ababa University, Department of Philosophy.