“Win-win Cooperation” Between Government and the Third-party Education Evaluation Agency—Enlightenment from Incentive Compatibility Theory
International Journal of Education, Culture and Society
Volume 4, Issue 5, October 2019, Pages: 81-86
Received: Sep. 23, 2019;
Accepted: Oct. 15, 2019;
Published: Oct. 24, 2019
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Yang Chun Sun, Graduate School of Education, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, China
An Qi Xu, Graduate School of Education, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, China
With the separation reform of supervision, running and evaluation in education in China, the government and the third-party evaluation agency begin to cooperate to conduct education evaluation. Obviously, the government and the third-party education evaluation agency have “different” interests demand because of the differences in identity. Existing research has recognized the the problem of “damage of public interest” that may arise from conflicts of interest and incompatibility between the two and the scholars also tried to solve the conflicts to realize the ideal expectation and vision of “win-win cooperation”. However, how can “win-win cooperation” of the government and the third-party evaluation agency be realized? This is the goal of the research. By using critical discourse analysis, this paper intends to clarify the interests compatibility between the government and third-party education evaluation agency, based on which, effective measures are proposed to avoid the moral hazard behaviors generated by the third-party education evaluation agency pursuing “selfish interests”. Consequently, the study finds that constructing relevant systems based on the “truth telling mechanism” of Incentive Compatibility Theory enables the third-party education evaluation agency to pursue its own interests through “legitimate ways” rather than “unjustified opportunistic ways”, thus, enhancing “collective value” while increasing “private interests”.
Yang Chun Sun,
An Qi Xu,
“Win-win Cooperation” Between Government and the Third-party Education Evaluation Agency—Enlightenment from Incentive Compatibility Theory, International Journal of Education, Culture and Society.
Vol. 4, No. 5,
2019, pp. 81-86.
Copyright © 2019 Authors retain the copyright of this article.
This article is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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