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Presumptions in EU Competition Law: Blurring the Substantive-Procedural Dichotomy

Received: 22 December 2020    Accepted: 5 January 2021    Published: 15 January 2021
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Abstract

In EU competition law, presumptions are widely used for reasons of efficiency. However, the legal mechanism for the establishment and application of presumptions in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union may not always support efficiency. Instead, the fact that CJEU not only considers the systematic concept of presumptions per se, but also takes into account the full effect of EU law and any directly applicable general legal principles renders the establishment and the application of presumptions unpredictable and sometimes inconsistent. This phenomenon owes largely to the CJEU’s contextual approach in interpreting EU law and the fragmentary nature of this approach. To have a better understanding of this phenomenon, this article first explores the operation of presumptions in EU competition law; second, through concrete examples, it examines the Court’s approach to establishing and applying the presumptions; third, it identifies the potential impacts of the Court’s contextual approach on the enforcement of EU competition law. The article seeks to demonstrate that the Court’s interventions in presumption-related issues have blurred the boundary between substantive and procedural law, and thus risk narrowing the principle of national procedural autonomy. The Court’s approach also presents challenges for the current system of decentralised enforcement of EU competition law by national courts.

Published in International Journal of Law and Society (Volume 4, Issue 1)
DOI 10.11648/j.ijls.20210401.11
Page(s) 1-9
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This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.

Copyright

Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Presumptions, EU Competition Law, Case Law, Substantive-Procedural Dichotomy

References
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[21] Capobianco, A. (2011). “OECD Roundtable on Safe Harbours and Legal Presumptions in Competition Law”. 128th Meeting of the OECD Competition Committee, Paris, para 11.
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[23] For example, the presumption of parental liability has only been rebutted four times to date. See Air Liquide (T-185/06) EU: T: 2011: 275.
[24] Spector Photo Group and Van Raemdonck (C-45/08) EU: C: 2009: 806.
[25] Montecatini (C-235/92 P) EU: C: 1999: 362.
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[27] Hüls (C-199/92 P) EU: C: 1999: 358.
[28] Anic Partecipazioni (C-49/92 P) EU: C: 1999: 356.
[29] Total Marketing Services (C-634/13 P) EU: C: 2015: 614.
[30] See e.g. Technische Unie (C-113/04 P) EU: C: 2006: 593—exclusive dealing agreements.
[31] See relevant factors for assessment of vertical agreements under art.101(1) in, Commission, “Commission Notice — Guidelines on Vertical Restraints” [2010] OJ C 130/1, paras 111-121.
[32] Bayer (C-2/01 P and C-3/01 P) EU: C: 2004: 2.
[33] For other legal presumptions applying to vertical restraints, see Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101 (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices [2010] OJ L102/1.
[34] Enichem Anic (T-6/89) EU: T: 1991: 74.
[35] Coats Holdings (T-439/07) EU: T: 2012: 320. The infringers held clandestine meetings in different countries, most frequently in a non-member country. The associated documents were reduced to a minimum.
[36] Verhuizingen Coppens (C-441/11 P) EU: C: 2012: 778.
[37] BPB (T-53/03) EU: T: 2008: 254.
[38] Villeroy & Boch Austria GmbH (C-626/13 P) EU: C: 2017: 54.
[39] Wood Pulp (C-89/85), EU: C: 1993: 120.
[40] Generics (C-307/18) EU: C: 2020: 52.
[41] Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union [2014] OJ L 349/1 (“Damage Directive”), art.2.
[42] Cartes Bancaires (C-67/13 P) EU: C: 2014: 2204.
[43] BIDS (C-209/07) EU: C: 2008: 643.
[44] Allianz Hungária Biztosító (C-32/11) EU: C: 2013: 160.
[45] Budapest Bank (C-228/18) EU: C: 2020: 265.
[46] Murphy (C-403/08 and C-429/08) EU: C: 2011: 631.
[47] Zelger, B. (2017). “‘By Object’ Restrictions Pursuant to Article 101 (1) TFEU: A Clear Matter or a Mess, and a Critical Analysis of the Court's Judgement in Expedia?”. European Competition Journal, 13 (2-3), 356.
[48] This is dissimilar to the position of per se infringements under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Ibáñez Colomo, P. and Lamadrid, A. (2017). “On the Notion of Restriction of Competition: What We Know and What We Don't Know We Know” in Gerard, D., Merola, M. and Meyring, B. (eds), The Notion of Restriction of Competition: Revisiting the Foundations of Antitrust Enforcement in Europe, Bruylant.
[49] Hoffmann-La Roche (C-85/76) EU: C: 1979: 36.
[50] Akzo Chemie (C-62/86) EU: C: 1991: 286.
[51] Lowe, P. (2006). “Remarks on Unilateral Conduct”, Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust Division Hearings on Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Washington D.C.
[52] Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C45/7, para 13.
[53] Intel (C-413/14 P) EU: C: 2017: 632.
[54] Tetra Pak (C-333/94 P) EU: C: 1996: 436.
[55] Fernández, C. (2009). “Presumptions and Burden of Proof in EU Competition Law: The Intel Judgment”. Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 10 (7), 448.
[56] Communication from the Commission–Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (Guidance Paper) (2009) OJ C 45/7, paras 28–31.
[57] General Quı´mica (C-90/09 P) EU: C: 2010: 517.
[58] Skanska Industrial Solutions (C-724/17) EU: C: 2019: 204.
[59] Oxera and others, (2009). “Quantifying Antitrust Damages – Towards Non-Binding Guidance for Courts”. Study prepared for the European Commission, < https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/fc667387-4658-48de-aa44-0f9b0dd3327d/language-en>, p. 91, accessed 23 June 2020. As quoted by Practical Guide, 93% of the cartel cases in the sample resulted in overcharges. Commission, “Commission Staff Working Document – Practical Guide on Quantifying Harm in Actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”, SWD (2013) 205, (“Practical Guide”).
[60] Filippeli, M. (2020). “Presumption of Harm in Cartel Damages Cases”. E. C. L. R. 41 (3), 137-140.
[61] Malinauskaite, J. and Cauffman, C. (2018). “The Transposition of the Damages Directive in the Small Member States of the EU – A Comparative Perspective”. Journal of Competition Law & Practice, 498.
[62] Odudu, O. and Sanchez-Graells, A. (2017). “The Interface of EU and National Tort Law”, in Giliker, P. (ed), Research Handbook on EU Tort Law. Edward Elgar, p. 164.
[63] Faull, J. and Nikpay, A. (eds), (2007). The EC Law of Competition, 2nd edn OUP, pp. 94–95.
[64] Bobek, M. (2014). “The Effects of EU Law in the National Legal Systems”, in Barnard, C. and Peers, S. (eds), European Union Law, OUP, p. 165.
[65] See the principle of national procedural autonomy in Rewe (C-33/76) EU: C: 1976: 188.
[66] EU Parliament, (2017). “The EU as a Community of Law: Overview of the Role of Law in the Union”, Briefing, , p. 7, accessed 18 June 2020.
[67] Weatherill, S. (2011). “Interpretation of the Directives: The Role of the Court”, in Hartkamp, A., Hesselink, M., Hondius, E., Mak, C. and du Perron, E. (eds), Towards a European Civil Code, Wolters Kluwer, p. 185.
[68] Damage Directive, art.5. See also Donau Chemie (C-536/11) EU: C: 2013: 366.
[69] Prechal, S. (2006) “National Courts in EU Judicial Structure”. Yearbook of European Law, 25 (1), 429-436.
[70] von Bogdandy, A. (2010) “Founding Principles of EU Law”. Revus, 12, para 41.
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    Xiaowen Tan. (2021). Presumptions in EU Competition Law: Blurring the Substantive-Procedural Dichotomy. International Journal of Law and Society, 4(1), 1-9. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijls.20210401.11

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    ACS Style

    Xiaowen Tan. Presumptions in EU Competition Law: Blurring the Substantive-Procedural Dichotomy. Int. J. Law Soc. 2021, 4(1), 1-9. doi: 10.11648/j.ijls.20210401.11

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    AMA Style

    Xiaowen Tan. Presumptions in EU Competition Law: Blurring the Substantive-Procedural Dichotomy. Int J Law Soc. 2021;4(1):1-9. doi: 10.11648/j.ijls.20210401.11

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  • @article{10.11648/j.ijls.20210401.11,
      author = {Xiaowen Tan},
      title = {Presumptions in EU Competition Law: Blurring the Substantive-Procedural Dichotomy},
      journal = {International Journal of Law and Society},
      volume = {4},
      number = {1},
      pages = {1-9},
      doi = {10.11648/j.ijls.20210401.11},
      url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijls.20210401.11},
      eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijls.20210401.11},
      abstract = {In EU competition law, presumptions are widely used for reasons of efficiency. However, the legal mechanism for the establishment and application of presumptions in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union may not always support efficiency. Instead, the fact that CJEU not only considers the systematic concept of presumptions per se, but also takes into account the full effect of EU law and any directly applicable general legal principles renders the establishment and the application of presumptions unpredictable and sometimes inconsistent. This phenomenon owes largely to the CJEU’s contextual approach in interpreting EU law and the fragmentary nature of this approach. To have a better understanding of this phenomenon, this article first explores the operation of presumptions in EU competition law; second, through concrete examples, it examines the Court’s approach to establishing and applying the presumptions; third, it identifies the potential impacts of the Court’s contextual approach on the enforcement of EU competition law. The article seeks to demonstrate that the Court’s interventions in presumption-related issues have blurred the boundary between substantive and procedural law, and thus risk narrowing the principle of national procedural autonomy. The Court’s approach also presents challenges for the current system of decentralised enforcement of EU competition law by national courts.},
     year = {2021}
    }
    

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    JF  - International Journal of Law and Society
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    AB  - In EU competition law, presumptions are widely used for reasons of efficiency. However, the legal mechanism for the establishment and application of presumptions in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union may not always support efficiency. Instead, the fact that CJEU not only considers the systematic concept of presumptions per se, but also takes into account the full effect of EU law and any directly applicable general legal principles renders the establishment and the application of presumptions unpredictable and sometimes inconsistent. This phenomenon owes largely to the CJEU’s contextual approach in interpreting EU law and the fragmentary nature of this approach. To have a better understanding of this phenomenon, this article first explores the operation of presumptions in EU competition law; second, through concrete examples, it examines the Court’s approach to establishing and applying the presumptions; third, it identifies the potential impacts of the Court’s contextual approach on the enforcement of EU competition law. The article seeks to demonstrate that the Court’s interventions in presumption-related issues have blurred the boundary between substantive and procedural law, and thus risk narrowing the principle of national procedural autonomy. The Court’s approach also presents challenges for the current system of decentralised enforcement of EU competition law by national courts.
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  • Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, Shanghai, China

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