Game Theory Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism of Technology Innovation Diffusion in the High-tech Zone
Advances in Sciences and Humanities
Volume 3, Issue 6, December 2017, Pages: 82-86
Received: Feb. 28, 2017; Accepted: Apr. 26, 2017; Published: Oct. 31, 2017
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Author
Yang Guo-zhong, Business School, Central South University, Changsha, China
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Abstract
By constructing and analyzing the incentive model of technology innovation diffusion in high-tech zone, it is found out that the traditional incentive mechanism will lead technology innovation diffusion into “Prisoner’s Dilemma”, and asymmetrical information’s merely direct incentive to the technology diffusion will result in incentive distortion. Thus, the improved incentive mechanism model based on pooling of interests in high-tech zone is brought forward, and the relevant factors influencing the level of innovation diffusion are obtained. There is a further conclusion that the design of incentive contract and incentive coefficient in high-tech zone should accord to the different innovation ability and the marginal income between the enterprises during diffusion respectively.
Keywords
High-tech Zone, Innovation Diffusion, Incentive Mechanism
To cite this article
Yang Guo-zhong, Game Theory Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism of Technology Innovation Diffusion in the High-tech Zone, Advances in Sciences and Humanities. Vol. 3, No. 6, 2017, pp. 82-86. doi: 10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 Authors retain the copyright of this article.
This article is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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