Advances in Sciences and Humanities

| Peer-Reviewed |

Game Theory Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism of Technology Innovation Diffusion in the High-tech Zone

Received: 28 February 2017    Accepted: 26 April 2017    Published: 31 October 2017
Views:       Downloads:

Share This Article

Abstract

By constructing and analyzing the incentive model of technology innovation diffusion in high-tech zone, it is found out that the traditional incentive mechanism will lead technology innovation diffusion into “Prisoner’s Dilemma”, and asymmetrical information’s merely direct incentive to the technology diffusion will result in incentive distortion. Thus, the improved incentive mechanism model based on pooling of interests in high-tech zone is brought forward, and the relevant factors influencing the level of innovation diffusion are obtained. There is a further conclusion that the design of incentive contract and incentive coefficient in high-tech zone should accord to the different innovation ability and the marginal income between the enterprises during diffusion respectively.

DOI 10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12
Published in Advances in Sciences and Humanities (Volume 3, Issue 6, December 2017)
Page(s) 82-86
Creative Commons

This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.

Copyright

Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

High-tech Zone, Innovation Diffusion, Incentive Mechanism

References
[1] Nunia. Carbonara Innovation process within geographical clusters: a cognitive Approach [J]. Technovation, 2004. (24):17-28.
[2] Montoro-Sanchez A., Ortiz-de-Urbina-Criado M., Mora-Valentin E. M. Effects of knowledge spillovers on innovation and collaboration in science and technology parks [J]. Journal of Knowledge Management, 2011, 15(6):948-970.
[3] Baptista Rui. Geographical Clusters and Innovation Diffusion [J]. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 2011, 66(1): 31-46.
[4] HUANG Hai-yang, CHEN Ji-xiang. Games Analysis on the technology innovation Diffusion of University and Enterprises’ Innovation Adoption. Scientific Management Research, 2012, 30(6):61-64.
[5] Gao Tao (Tony), Leichter Gordon, Wei Yinghong. Countervailing effects of value and risk perceptions in manufacturers' adoption of expensive, discontinuous innovations [J]. INDUSTRIAL MARKETING MANAGEMENT. 2012, 41(4): 659-668.
[6] Risselada Hans, Verhoef Peter C., Bijmolt Tammo H. A. Dynamic Effects of Social Influence and Direct Marketing on the Adoption of High-Technology Products [J]. JOURNAL OF MARKETING, 2014, 78(2): 52-68.
[7] Wang Zhanzhao; Ma Yonghong; Zhang Fan. Study on Technology Innovation Diffusion Model and Simulation Based on System Dynamics. Science & Technology Progress and Policy, 2015, 32(19):13-19.
[8] HUANG Wei-qiang; YAO Shuang; ZHUANG Xin-tian; XIN Wei. Innovation Diffusion Modeling Based on Scale-Free Networks. Journal of Northeastern University (Natural Science), 2015, 36(8):1212-1216.
[9] Stummer Christian, Kiesling Elmar, Guenther Markus. Innovation diffusion of repeat purchase products in a competitive market: An agent-based simulation approach [J]. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH. 2015, 245(1): 157-167.
[10] XU Ying-ying; QI Liang-qun. Research on low carbon technological innovation diffusion in enterprises clusters based on evolutionary game theory on complex networks. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2016, 26(8):16-24.
[11] MA Yong-hong, WANG Zhan-zhao, LI Huan, ZHOU Wen. Network Structure, Adopters Preference and Innovation Diffusion: A Simulation Analysis of the S-D Model of Innovation Diffusion Based on the Decision Making Process of Adopters. Operations Research and Management Science, 2016, 25(3): 106-116.
[12] Anand Adarsh, Agarwal Mohini, Aggrawal Deepti. Unified approach for modeling innovation adoption and optimal model selection for the diffusion process [J]. JOURNAL OF ADVANCES IN MANAGEMENT RESEARCH, 2016, 13(2): 154-178.
[13] Merton R C. Option pricing when underlying stock returns discontinuous [J]. Journal of Financial Economic, 1976, 3(1-2): 125-144.
[14] Jensen R A. Multiplant firms and innovation adoption and diffusion [J]. Southern Economic Journal, 2004, 70(3): 213-229.
[15] Kerr S. On the Folly of Rewarding for A While Hoping for B [J]. Academy of Management Journal, 1975, 18(4):769-783.
[16] Holmstrom B, Milgrom P. Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives [J]. Econometrica, 1987, (55): 303-328.
Author Information
  • Business School, Central South University, Changsha, China

Cite This Article
  • APA Style

    Yang Guo-zhong. (2017). Game Theory Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism of Technology Innovation Diffusion in the High-tech Zone. Advances in Sciences and Humanities, 3(6), 82-86. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12

    Copy | Download

    ACS Style

    Yang Guo-zhong. Game Theory Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism of Technology Innovation Diffusion in the High-tech Zone. Adv. Sci. Humanit. 2017, 3(6), 82-86. doi: 10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12

    Copy | Download

    AMA Style

    Yang Guo-zhong. Game Theory Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism of Technology Innovation Diffusion in the High-tech Zone. Adv Sci Humanit. 2017;3(6):82-86. doi: 10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12

    Copy | Download

  • @article{10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12,
      author = {Yang Guo-zhong},
      title = {Game Theory Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism of Technology Innovation Diffusion in the High-tech Zone},
      journal = {Advances in Sciences and Humanities},
      volume = {3},
      number = {6},
      pages = {82-86},
      doi = {10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12},
      url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12},
      eprint = {https://download.sciencepg.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ash.20170306.12},
      abstract = {By constructing and analyzing the incentive model of technology innovation diffusion in high-tech zone, it is found out that the traditional incentive mechanism will lead technology innovation diffusion into “Prisoner’s Dilemma”, and asymmetrical information’s merely direct incentive to the technology diffusion will result in incentive distortion. Thus, the improved incentive mechanism model based on pooling of interests in high-tech zone is brought forward, and the relevant factors influencing the level of innovation diffusion are obtained. There is a further conclusion that the design of incentive contract and incentive coefficient in high-tech zone should accord to the different innovation ability and the marginal income between the enterprises during diffusion respectively.},
     year = {2017}
    }
    

    Copy | Download

  • TY  - JOUR
    T1  - Game Theory Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism of Technology Innovation Diffusion in the High-tech Zone
    AU  - Yang Guo-zhong
    Y1  - 2017/10/31
    PY  - 2017
    N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12
    DO  - 10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12
    T2  - Advances in Sciences and Humanities
    JF  - Advances in Sciences and Humanities
    JO  - Advances in Sciences and Humanities
    SP  - 82
    EP  - 86
    PB  - Science Publishing Group
    SN  - 2472-0984
    UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12
    AB  - By constructing and analyzing the incentive model of technology innovation diffusion in high-tech zone, it is found out that the traditional incentive mechanism will lead technology innovation diffusion into “Prisoner’s Dilemma”, and asymmetrical information’s merely direct incentive to the technology diffusion will result in incentive distortion. Thus, the improved incentive mechanism model based on pooling of interests in high-tech zone is brought forward, and the relevant factors influencing the level of innovation diffusion are obtained. There is a further conclusion that the design of incentive contract and incentive coefficient in high-tech zone should accord to the different innovation ability and the marginal income between the enterprises during diffusion respectively.
    VL  - 3
    IS  - 6
    ER  - 

    Copy | Download

  • Sections