Evolutionary Game Analysis of Downstream Governments Compensation Enthusiasm Under the Basin Ecological Compensation Mechanism

Guoshun Ma; Anwen Li; Ruxia Ma

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Downstream Governments Compensation Enthusiasm Under the Basin Ecological Compensation Mechanism

Guoshun Ma, Anwen Li, Ruxia Ma

Published in Asia-Pacific Journal of Mathematics and Statistics (Volume 1, Issue 4)

Received: 23 December 2019 Accepted: 19 February 2020 Published: 2 March 2020

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Abstract

China's basin ecological compensation mechanism is in the initial establishment stage, but it still has practical problems in some areas. In order to ensure that the mechanism operates normally and efficiently between upper and lower watersheds, further research is needed on related issues. Under the basin ecological compensation mechanism, this paper establishes a game model with the theory of evolutionary games for compensation enthusiasm interest conversion relationship between downstream governments and analyzes the evolutionary stability strategy. Without the constraints of higher-level governments, the evolutionary stability strategy of the downstream intergovernmental game is that one party actively compensates and the other passively compensates, resulting in a vicious circle of imbalances in the amount of downstream governments compensation for upstream, and it is difficult to jointly compensate for upstream environmental protection policies. After the supervision and punishment mechanism of the superior government are introduced, the evolutionary stability strategy of the downstream intergovernmental game becomes an active compensation for both parties. Therefore, the upstream government has sufficient funds to protect the governance environment , and the downstream can make full use of the advantages of resources and environment to promote economic development. Thus the operating efficiency of the basin ecological compensation mechanism is improved.

Published in	Asia-Pacific Journal of Mathematics and Statistics (Volume 1, Issue 4)
Page(s)	44-48
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Basin Ecological Compensation, Downstream Government, Compensation Enthusiasm, Evolutionary Stability Strategy

References

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APA Style

Guoshun Ma, Anwen Li, Ruxia Ma. (2020). Evolutionary Game Analysis of Downstream Governments Compensation Enthusiasm Under the Basin Ecological Compensation Mechanism. Asia-Pacific Journal of Mathematics and Statistics, 1(4), 44-48.

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ACS Style

Guoshun Ma; Anwen Li; Ruxia Ma. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Downstream Governments Compensation Enthusiasm Under the Basin Ecological Compensation Mechanism. Asia-Pac. J. Math. Stat. 2020, 1(4), 44-48.

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AMA Style

Guoshun Ma, Anwen Li, Ruxia Ma. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Downstream Governments Compensation Enthusiasm Under the Basin Ecological Compensation Mechanism. Asia-Pac J Math Stat. 2020;1(4):44-48.

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@article{10045766,
  author = {Guoshun Ma and Anwen Li and Ruxia Ma},
  title = {Evolutionary Game Analysis of Downstream Governments Compensation Enthusiasm Under the Basin Ecological Compensation Mechanism},
  journal = {Asia-Pacific Journal of Mathematics and Statistics},
  volume = {1},
  number = {4},
  pages = {44-48},
  url = {https://www.sciencepublishinggroup.com/article/10045766},
  abstract = {China's basin ecological compensation mechanism is in the initial establishment stage, but it still has practical problems in some areas. In order to ensure that the mechanism operates normally and efficiently between upper and lower watersheds, further research is needed on related issues. Under the basin ecological compensation mechanism, this paper establishes a game model with the theory of evolutionary games for compensation enthusiasm interest conversion relationship between downstream governments and analyzes the evolutionary stability strategy. Without the constraints of higher-level governments, the evolutionary stability strategy of the downstream intergovernmental game is that one party actively compensates and the other passively compensates, resulting in a vicious circle of imbalances in the amount of downstream governments compensation for upstream, and it is difficult to jointly compensate for upstream environmental protection policies. After the supervision and punishment mechanism of the superior government are introduced, the evolutionary stability strategy of the downstream intergovernmental game becomes an active compensation for both parties. Therefore, the upstream government has sufficient funds to protect the governance environment , and the downstream can make full use of the advantages of resources and environment to promote economic development. Thus the operating efficiency of the basin ecological compensation mechanism is improved.},
 year = {2020}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Evolutionary Game Analysis of Downstream Governments Compensation Enthusiasm Under the Basin Ecological Compensation Mechanism
AU  - Guoshun Ma
AU  - Anwen Li
AU  - Ruxia Ma
Y1  - 2020/03/02
PY  - 2020
T2  - Asia-Pacific Journal of Mathematics and Statistics
JF  - Asia-Pacific Journal of Mathematics and Statistics
JO  - Asia-Pacific Journal of Mathematics and Statistics
SP  - 44
EP  - 48
PB  - Science Publishing Group
UR  - http://www.sciencepg.com/article/10045766
AB  - China's basin ecological compensation mechanism is in the initial establishment stage, but it still has practical problems in some areas. In order to ensure that the mechanism operates normally and efficiently between upper and lower watersheds, further research is needed on related issues. Under the basin ecological compensation mechanism, this paper establishes a game model with the theory of evolutionary games for compensation enthusiasm interest conversion relationship between downstream governments and analyzes the evolutionary stability strategy. Without the constraints of higher-level governments, the evolutionary stability strategy of the downstream intergovernmental game is that one party actively compensates and the other passively compensates, resulting in a vicious circle of imbalances in the amount of downstream governments compensation for upstream, and it is difficult to jointly compensate for upstream environmental protection policies. After the supervision and punishment mechanism of the superior government are introduced, the evolutionary stability strategy of the downstream intergovernmental game becomes an active compensation for both parties. Therefore, the upstream government has sufficient funds to protect the governance environment , and the downstream can make full use of the advantages of resources and environment to promote economic development. Thus the operating efficiency of the basin ecological compensation mechanism is improved.
VL  - 1
IS  - 4
ER  -

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Author Information

Guoshun Ma

School of Mathematics and Statistics, Northwest Normal University, Lanzhou, China
Anwen Li

School of Mathematics and Statistics, Northwest Normal University, Lanzhou, China
Ruxia Ma

School of Mathematics and Statistics, Northwest Normal University, Lanzhou, China

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Plain Text BibTeX RIS

APA Style

Guoshun Ma, Anwen Li, Ruxia Ma. (2020). Evolutionary Game Analysis of Downstream Governments Compensation Enthusiasm Under the Basin Ecological Compensation Mechanism. Asia-Pacific Journal of Mathematics and Statistics, 1(4), 44-48.

Copy | Download

ACS Style

Guoshun Ma; Anwen Li; Ruxia Ma. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Downstream Governments Compensation Enthusiasm Under the Basin Ecological Compensation Mechanism. Asia-Pac. J. Math. Stat. 2020, 1(4), 44-48.

Copy | Download

AMA Style

Guoshun Ma, Anwen Li, Ruxia Ma. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Downstream Governments Compensation Enthusiasm Under the Basin Ecological Compensation Mechanism. Asia-Pac J Math Stat. 2020;1(4):44-48.

Copy | Download

@article{10045766,
  author = {Guoshun Ma and Anwen Li and Ruxia Ma},
  title = {Evolutionary Game Analysis of Downstream Governments Compensation Enthusiasm Under the Basin Ecological Compensation Mechanism},
  journal = {Asia-Pacific Journal of Mathematics and Statistics},
  volume = {1},
  number = {4},
  pages = {44-48},
  url = {https://www.sciencepublishinggroup.com/article/10045766},
  abstract = {China's basin ecological compensation mechanism is in the initial establishment stage, but it still has practical problems in some areas. In order to ensure that the mechanism operates normally and efficiently between upper and lower watersheds, further research is needed on related issues. Under the basin ecological compensation mechanism, this paper establishes a game model with the theory of evolutionary games for compensation enthusiasm interest conversion relationship between downstream governments and analyzes the evolutionary stability strategy. Without the constraints of higher-level governments, the evolutionary stability strategy of the downstream intergovernmental game is that one party actively compensates and the other passively compensates, resulting in a vicious circle of imbalances in the amount of downstream governments compensation for upstream, and it is difficult to jointly compensate for upstream environmental protection policies. After the supervision and punishment mechanism of the superior government are introduced, the evolutionary stability strategy of the downstream intergovernmental game becomes an active compensation for both parties. Therefore, the upstream government has sufficient funds to protect the governance environment , and the downstream can make full use of the advantages of resources and environment to promote economic development. Thus the operating efficiency of the basin ecological compensation mechanism is improved.},
 year = {2020}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Evolutionary Game Analysis of Downstream Governments Compensation Enthusiasm Under the Basin Ecological Compensation Mechanism
AU  - Guoshun Ma
AU  - Anwen Li
AU  - Ruxia Ma
Y1  - 2020/03/02
PY  - 2020
T2  - Asia-Pacific Journal of Mathematics and Statistics
JF  - Asia-Pacific Journal of Mathematics and Statistics
JO  - Asia-Pacific Journal of Mathematics and Statistics
SP  - 44
EP  - 48
PB  - Science Publishing Group
UR  - http://www.sciencepg.com/article/10045766
AB  - China's basin ecological compensation mechanism is in the initial establishment stage, but it still has practical problems in some areas. In order to ensure that the mechanism operates normally and efficiently between upper and lower watersheds, further research is needed on related issues. Under the basin ecological compensation mechanism, this paper establishes a game model with the theory of evolutionary games for compensation enthusiasm interest conversion relationship between downstream governments and analyzes the evolutionary stability strategy. Without the constraints of higher-level governments, the evolutionary stability strategy of the downstream intergovernmental game is that one party actively compensates and the other passively compensates, resulting in a vicious circle of imbalances in the amount of downstream governments compensation for upstream, and it is difficult to jointly compensate for upstream environmental protection policies. After the supervision and punishment mechanism of the superior government are introduced, the evolutionary stability strategy of the downstream intergovernmental game becomes an active compensation for both parties. Therefore, the upstream government has sufficient funds to protect the governance environment , and the downstream can make full use of the advantages of resources and environment to promote economic development. Thus the operating efficiency of the basin ecological compensation mechanism is improved.
VL  - 1
IS  - 4
ER  -

Copy | Download