2. Whitehead Project of Process Philosophy
According to our view in this study, is to show that Whitehead‘s project of process philosophy is to reconcile the conflicting views between the physical and the mental entities or better still the rationalists and the empiricists which in turn to show that whitehead’s project of process philosophy is the continuation of Kant’sown project. In effect, showing new criterion of a philosophical approach presented by whitehead. Before then, we have tried to presents in their thought how they have rejected the rational dogma in the ideas of their predecessors.
2.1. Rejection of Rational Dogmatism in Philosophy
This section centers on rejection of rational dogmatism in philosophy which is often referred to Kant’s philosophy challenging pure reason's ability to grasp metaphysical truths beyond experience but focus is not limited to Kant alone but whitehead as well. Its focuses on analyzing the different approaches of tackling dogmatism by the authors, beginning with Kant and end with whitehead. But then, what is dogmatism? Dogmatism comes from Greek “dogma”, which means belief, or public decree or ordinance. Originally the term “dogma” is a religious doctrine proclaimed by scripture or the Church, which requires popular acceptance without rational justification
| [6] | Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu, The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy, Main Street, Malden, Blackwell publishing, 2004, PP. 1-766. |
[6]
. This is so because it is believed coming from a supreme being or a class of authority which is unquestionable, in the Christianity light, it is from God or is God talking via any speaker or preacher, be it the pastor, father, priest or pope. Thus, a dogma is indisputable and unchallengeable. According to skeptical critics, any metaphysical proposition is a dogma because, although there may be a rational argument for it, this argument itself relies on some unproved first principles and is therefore unreliable. Hence, any metaphysical doctrine is allegedly open to the charge of dogmatism. This ancient skepticism charged all non-skeptical philosophies with dogmatism, meaning that they were committed to some doctrines which they believed to be indubitably true. This does not entail that all knowledge is false or skepticism would turn out to be a negative form of dogmatism. For ancient skepticism, we should “suspend our judgment” because knowledge is neither possible nor impossible
| [6] | Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu, The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy, Main Street, Malden, Blackwell publishing, 2004, PP. 1-766. |
[6]
According to “Sextus Empiricus” “some people have claimed to have found the truth …those who think they have found it are the dogmatists
| [7] | Sextus Empiricus, outlines of pyrronism, New York Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996. PP, 1-280. |
[7]
. This means that those who are properly called dogmatists are those who think that they have discovered the truth
| [6] | Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu, The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy, Main Street, Malden, Blackwell publishing, 2004, PP. 1-766. |
[6].
This implies that dogmatism is the capacity to establish an unbeatable truth or reality.
In German philosophy, dogmatism is the position that knowledge arises from the effect of independent reality on the mind and contrasts with Kantian transcendental idealism. In modern times, dogmatism is the uncritical, partial, and possibly irrational persistence of some opinion
| [6] | Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu, The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy, Main Street, Malden, Blackwell publishing, 2004, PP. 1-766. |
[6]
. According paul Guyer, “Kant defines the position of critical philosophy in contrast to dogmatism, empiricism, skepticism, and indifferentism. He seeks to carve out for theoretical philosophy a significant but limited domain, distinct from that of empirical knowledge and the opinions of common sense, but excluding the exaggerated claims that have brought metaphysics into disrepute
| [8] | Immanuel Kant, Critique of pure reason, The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge University Press, 1998. PP. 1-785. |
[8]
And to Alberto vanzo, “Kant employs the notions of empiricism and rationalism in his sketches of the history of ancient and modern philosophy. Some ancient philosophers, like Socrates, focused only on practical philosophy. Those who had a theoretical philosophy were either dogmatists or skeptics. Unsurprisingly, Kant identifies a central problem of his own philosophy as a main source of disputes between dogmatists: What is the origin of our intellectual concepts? Depending on how philosophers answered that question, Kant divides them into philosophers “ex principiis sensitivis” and philosophers “ex principiis rationalibus” in his metaphysics notes entitled
Reflexionen meaning
Reflections, that is, empiricists and noologists or rationalists respectively. Interestingly, some lecture transcripts differentiate not two, but three positions: mysticism, empiricism, and rationalism
| [9] | Alberto vanzo, "Kant on Empiricism and Rationalism", History of philosophy quarterly, January 2013, volume 1, PP, 53-74. |
[9]
. Kant argued the rationalists made claims about reality without examining cognition’s limits, we can’t know “things in themselves” we know how things appear to us, phenomena. Kant equally describes the dogmatism of the empiricists as “principle of pure empiricism” and the rationalists as “dogmatism of pure reason”. To this effect, “Kant held dogmatism to be capricious, opinionated, faction ridden and consequently unstable and open to the contempt of rational observers. Yet Kant wanted to distinguish his own critical stance toward dogmatism from several other ways of rejecting it, which he regarded as themselves equally dangerous to the cause of reason
| [8] | Immanuel Kant, Critique of pure reason, The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge University Press, 1998. PP. 1-785. |
[8]
. Thus “dogmatism” to Kant is "the presumption of being able to acquire metaphysical knowledge by means of a priori reasoning, without a prior inquiry into whether metaphysical knowledge lies within human grasp
| [9] | Alberto vanzo, "Kant on Empiricism and Rationalism", History of philosophy quarterly, January 2013, volume 1, PP, 53-74. |
[9]
.
Kant qualifies the empiricism of the antinomies as dogmatic (A471/B499). As is well known, Kant rejects this dogmatic form of empiricism. In his view, empiricists should not claim that the world is eternal, that it is infinitely extended, and that all bodies are divisible. They should only claim that we can continue indefinitely in discovering new regions of the world, identifying earlier causes of past events, and dividing each body into increasingly smaller parts. Empiricists should endorse a modest form of empiricism
| [9] | Alberto vanzo, "Kant on Empiricism and Rationalism", History of philosophy quarterly, January 2013, volume 1, PP, 53-74. |
[9]
. Kant suggest that “in this empirical regress there can be encountered no experience of an absolute boundary, and hence no experience of a condition as one that is absolutely unconditioned empirically”. This empiricism is modest because it warrants claims on only what we can experience, not on what exists or does not exist beyond the bounds of experience. Modest empiricism is as consistent with dogmatism and the positive claims of the theses as it is with immodest empiricism and the negative claims of the antitheses
| [9] | Alberto vanzo, "Kant on Empiricism and Rationalism", History of philosophy quarterly, January 2013, volume 1, PP, 53-74. |
[9]
.
Kant also recommended that "empiricists “take all concepts of the understanding from experience”. As for judgments, empiricists claim that no synthetic judgments can have an a priori justification. Kant’s proof that such judgments exist makes empiricism “completely untenable. Empiricists, too, distinguish concepts from intuitions. They claim that all concepts are acquired a posteriori on the basis of sensations
| [9] | Alberto vanzo, "Kant on Empiricism and Rationalism", History of philosophy quarterly, January 2013, volume 1, PP, 53-74. |
[9]
. Kant answers the empiricists by placing “his argument on the premise that our experience can be ascribed to a single identical subject, via what he calls the "transcendental unity of apperception," only if the elements of experience given in intuition are synthetically combined so as to present us with objects that are thought through the categories. The categories are held to apply to objects, therefore, not because these objects make the categories possible, but rather because the categories themselves constitute necessary conditions for the representation of all possible objects of experience”
| [8] | Immanuel Kant, Critique of pure reason, The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge University Press, 1998. PP. 1-785. |
[8]
.
“Rationalism” is the term that Kant uses from the late 1780s onward to designate noologism, that is, the admission of nonempirical concepts and a priori principles
| [9] | Alberto vanzo, "Kant on Empiricism and Rationalism", History of philosophy quarterly, January 2013, volume 1, PP, 53-74. |
[9]
According to Kant, “the antinomy of pure reason in its cosmological ideas is removed by showing that it is merely dialectical and a conflict due to an illusion arising from the fact that one has applied the idea of absolute totality, which is valid only as a condition of things in themselves, to appearances that exist only in representation
| [8] | Immanuel Kant, Critique of pure reason, The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge University Press, 1998. PP. 1-785. |
[8]
To paul Guyer, Kant’s "Transcendental Dialectic," however, is dedicated to arguing that the other three parts of the rationalist system are pseudo-sciences founded on inevitable illusions of human reason attempting to extend itself beyond the limits of sensibility. Kant does not present the three rationalistic pseudo-sciences as mere historical artifacts, but attempts to display them as inevitable products of human reason by associating them with the unconditioned use of the three traditional forms of syllogism: categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive
| [8] | Immanuel Kant, Critique of pure reason, The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge University Press, 1998. PP. 1-785. |
[8]
”Kant's overall argument is that although these rationalist doctrines are inevitable illusions they are still pseudo-sciences, and must give way to doctrines remaining within the limits of sensibility: rational psychology gives way to empirical psychology, which Kant expounded in his lectures in the form of "anthropology"; rational cosmology gives way to the metaphysical foundations of natural science, which Kant derives by adding the sole empirical concept of motion to the principles of judgment; and rational theology gives way to what Kant will call moral theology, the doctrine that God and immortality are postulated, along with freedom of the will, solely as conditions of the possibility of human morality
| [8] | Immanuel Kant, Critique of pure reason, The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge University Press, 1998. PP. 1-785. |
[8]
.
Kant had been concerned to resolve a number of the most fundamental scientific controversies of his epoch and to establish once and for all the basic principles of scientific knowledge of the world
| [8] | Immanuel Kant, Critique of pure reason, The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge University Press, 1998. PP. 1-785. |
[8]
. The nature of knowledge and the nature of morality were two main concerns of Kant’s philosophical thinking. In his masterpiece,
Critique of Pure Reason (1781; 2
nd edn. 1787), examined the cognitive powers of the mind in order to answer the question of how experience is possible
| [6] | Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu, The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy, Main Street, Malden, Blackwell publishing, 2004, PP. 1-766. |
[6]
Theoretical knowledge must involve both sensibility and understanding and is possible solely through a fundamental role for synthetic a priori judgments. To explain how synthetic a priori knowledge is possible, Kant argued for the existence of a priori intuitions (space and time) in sensibility and a priori concepts (categories) in understanding. These intuitions and concepts, rather than being empirically discovered, constitute the basic forms necessary for having any experience. This account sought to reconcile and overcome the limited doctrines of Leibniz’s or Wolff’s rationalism and Hume’s empiricism. Kant argued that the conflicting views of traditional metaphysics were inevitably generated by the tendency of pure reason to go beyond the limits of sensory experience, where it cannot provide knowledge
| [6] | Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu, The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy, Main Street, Malden, Blackwell publishing, 2004, PP. 1-766. |
[6]
.
Kant sought to replace traditional metaphysics by a transcendental metaphysics based on the justification of the categories. Although this metaphysics denied traditional knowledge claims, it allowed for faith in the existence of God and room for human freedom. The Prolegomena to Every Future Metaphysics (1783) outlines the main argument of the Critique of Pure Reason. The "Transcendental Logic" turns to the main destructive task of the Critique of Pure Reason, and that which gives it its name, the task of discrediting dogmatism and displaying the limits of metaphysics. The "Transcendental Analytic" has prepared the way for this critique of traditional metaphysics and its foundations by its argument that synthetic a priori principles can be established only within the limited domain of sensible experience. But Kant's aim in the "Dialectic" is not only to show the failure of a metaphysics that transcends the boundaries of possible experience. At the same time, he also wants to demonstrate that the questions that preoccupy metaphysics are inevitable, and that the arguments of metaphysics, although deceptive, should not be dismissed without sympathetic comprehension
| [8] | Immanuel Kant, Critique of pure reason, The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge University Press, 1998. PP. 1-785. |
[8]
Kant really did not escape dogmatism because of the noumena categories, Kant’s thing in itself is itself a dogmatic assumption.
According to whitehead, “Philosophy has been haunted by the unfortunate notion that its method is dogmatically to indicate premises which are severally clear, distinct, and certain; and to erect upon those premises a deductive system of thought
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. So dogmatism to whitehead is the adoption of this particular philosophical method in the history of thought. He believes that “the rise of European philosophy was largely promoted by the development of mathematics into a science of abstract generality. But in its subsequent development the method of philosophy has also been vitiated by the example of mathematics
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. Thus to whitehead, “Philosophy has been misled by the example of mathematics; and even in mathematics the statement of the ultimate logical principles is beset with difficulties, as yet insuperable
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. In this sense philosophy has advanced from Plato onwards. According to this account of the achievement of rationalism, the chief error in philosophy is overstatement. The aim at generalization is sound, but the estimate of success is exaggerated. There are two main forms of such overstatement. One form is what I have termed, elsewhere the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness.' This fallacy consists in neglecting the degree of abstraction involved when an actual entity is considered merely so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought. European thought is represented as littered with metaphysical systems, abandoned and unreconciled. Such an assertion tacitly fastens upon philosophy the old dogmatic test
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
.
Descartes and Locke maintained a two-substance ontology-Descartes explicitly, Locke by implication. Therefore, Whitehead’s aim was to reconcile the two-substance ontological dogmatism presented by Descartes and Locke, in order to do this, he sorts to reframe a new philosophical method which differed from that of his predecessors by questioning their positions and where possibly err. This underlining philosophy he called the “philosophy of organism”. This is will be the focus of subsequent study.
2.2. Renewed Criterion of Philosophical Approach
After the rejection of rational dogmatism,
We begin this section with the close examination of this whitehead’s affirmation, that launches his problematic and summarizes his thesis, he writes:
In its turn every philosophy will suffer a deposition. But the bundle of philosophic systems expresses a variety of general truths about the universe, awaiting coordination and assignment of their various spheres of validity. Such progress in coordination is provided by the advance of philosophy; and in this sense philosophy has advanced from Plato onwards. According to this account of the achievement of rationalism, the chief error in philosophy is overstatement. The aim at generalization is sound, but the estimate of success is exaggerated. There are two main forms of such overstatement. One form is what I have termed, t elsewhere/ the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness.' This fallacy consists in neglecting the degree of abstraction involved when an actual entity is considered merely, so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought. There are aspects of actualities which are simply ignored so long as we restrict thought to these categories. Thus the success of a philosophy is to be measured by its comparative avoidance of this fallacy, when thought is restricted within its categories. The other form of overstatement consists in a false estimate of logical procedure in respect to certainty, and in respect to premises. Philosophy has been haunted by the unfortunate notion that its method is dogmatically to indicate premises which are severally clear, distinct, and certain; and to erect upon those premises a deductive system of thought”
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
.
Whitehead acknowledge the fact that the disposition in the philosophical thought has led to the advancement of philosophy but the major err in this advancement is what he called “overstatement” termed in
science and modern world as “fallacy of misplaced concreteness” which means taking an abstract for a concrete. This problematic raise by whitehead here is recurrent throughout his intellectual work. It is a position taken by him to embarked on his philosophical journey. According to whitehead philosophy has fallen into the mess of mathematics or better still philosophers has been misled by mathematics because mathematics has brought abstractions into philosophy. whitehead presuppose that, “If we may trust the Pythagorean tradition, the rise of European philosophy was largely promoted by the development of mathematics into a science of abstract generality. But in its subsequent development the method of philosophy has also been vitiated by the example of mathematics”
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
.”Under the influence of mathematics, deduction has been foisted onto philosophy as its standard method, instead of taking its true place as an essential auxiliary mode of verification whereby to test the scope of generalities. This misapprehension of philosophic method has veiled the very considerable success of philosophy in providing generic notions which add lucidity to our apprehension of the facts of experience”
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. Not only abstractions that mathematics has brought into philosophy but as well change the method of philosophy. Therefore, whitehead look into the necessity to reconstruct philosophy. To him, one aim of philosophy is to challenge the half-truths constituting the scientific first principles
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. Consequently, whitehead insisted that “philosophy will not regain its proper status until the gradual elaboration of categoreal schemes, definitely stated at each stage of progress, is recognized as its proper objective” “The primary method of mathematics is deduction and the primary method of philosophy is descriptive generalization
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. So as each study requires a method and objective, Whitehead suggest the method of philosophy as descriptive generalization that will enable him to reconstruct philosophy.
He began this new philosophical approach by introducing a new language. He affirms that “a new idea introduces a new alternative; and we are not less indebted to a thinker when we adopt the alternative which he discarded. Philosophy never reverts to its old position after the shock of a great philosopher
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
Thus “the movement of historical, and philosophical, criticism of detached questions, which on the whole has dominated the last two centuries, has done its work, and requires to be supplemented by a more sustained effort of constructive thought
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. Base on this whitehead’s constructive thought John B. Cobb explains that “Whitehead did not follow that procedure in the Western tradition philosophers had frequently expressed new insights partly in existing language and partly by creating new terms. The new terms appeal for new insights on the part of readers, but the philosopher discusses them extensively in more familiar language in order to aid in the attainment of the new insight. Whitehead continued that tradition. It may be, however, that the novelty of his vision is greater than that of his predecessors or, at least, is more sharply at odds with the inherited language. His task is to use one language to point to insights that are quite different from those that language normally conveys. He introduces new terms and concepts to give expression to these insights, in some sense, to fix them
| [10] | John. B. Cobb, Jr, A Glossary with alphabetical index to technical terms in process and reality, whitehead word book, Claremont, P&F Press. 2008. PP, 1-88. |
[10]
Accordingly, whitehead affirms that so as “every science must devise its own instruments. The tool required for philosophy is language. Thus philosophy redesigns language in the same way that, in a physical science, pre-existing appliances are redesigned. It is exactly at this point that the appeal to facts is a difficult operation. This appeal is not solely to the expression of the facts in current verbal statements
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
“For Whitehead, nothing in science is beyond the possible need of revision. Certainly this is true of philosophy as well
| [10] | John. B. Cobb, Jr, A Glossary with alphabetical index to technical terms in process and reality, whitehead word book, Claremont, P&F Press. 2008. PP, 1-88. |
[10]
. whitehead concluded that, the tool required by philosophy is language.
The renew criterion for the philosophical approach requires a language which is different from that of his predecessors. This is because, new language leads a different way of observing and interpreting the world. He affirms thus, “No deeply original thinking can be expressed adequately in existing language. That language operates among people who see the world in a particular way. The deeply original thought leads to a different way of seeing the world. It has to work against the implications of the existing language. It has to draw the readers or the hearers into noticing features of experience that have heretofore eluded them. It has to evoke to consciousness dim intuitions that have been suppressed by the existing conceptuality and socialization. One cannot translate the new vision into the vocabulary of the old. In Jesus’ words, this would be to pour new wine into old wineskins
| [10] | John. B. Cobb, Jr, A Glossary with alphabetical index to technical terms in process and reality, whitehead word book, Claremont, P&F Press. 2008. PP, 1-88. |
[10]
This assertion from Cobbs is indeed true whitehead declares that “I use the phrase 'eternal object' for what in the preceding paragraph of this section I have termed a 'Platonic form
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
So whitehead substituted Plato’s form with “eternal object” and in the same light, he said, “for Descartes the word 'substance' is the equivalent of my phrase 'actual occasion.' I refrain from the term 'substance,' for one reason because it suggests the subject-predicate notion; and for another reason because Descartes and Locke permit their substances to undergo adventures of changing qualifications, and thereby create difficulties
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. Thus, an introduction of new terminologies in philosophy. Whitehead further explains that his reasons for not using the same language in his scientific metaphysics are, as thus:
An old established metaphysical system gains a false air of adequate precision from the fact that its words and phrases have passed into current literature. Thus propositions expressed in its language are more easily correlated to our flitting intuitions into metaphysical truth. When we trust these verbal statements and argue as though they adequately analyzed meaning, we are led into difficulties which take the shape of negations of what in practice is presupposed. But when they are proposed as first principles they assume an unmerited air of sober obviousness. Their defect is that the true propositions which they do express lose their fundamental character when subjected to adequate expression. For example consider the type of propositions such as 'The grass is green,' and 'The whale is big.' This subject-predicate form of statement seems so simple, leading straight to a metaphysical first principle; and yet in these examples it conceals such complex, diverse meanings
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5].
Whitehead explains that “the true method of philosophical construction is to frame a scheme of ideas, the best that one can, and unflinchingly to explore the interpretation of experience in terms of that scheme. And, that all constructive thought, on the various special topics of scientific interest, is dominated by some such scheme, unacknowledged, but no less influential in guiding the imagination. The importance of philosophy lies in its sustained effort to make such schemes explicit and thereby capable of criticism and improvement
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. In order to go about with this new philosophical approach, he calls for a “frame of a scheme of ideas” and this “scheme of ideas” is what called “speculative philosophy” Speculative Philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. From this speculative philosophy, whitehead justifies his position that we have earlier mentioned at the beginning of this section of study. He explains that “it is the ideal of speculative philosophy that its fundamental notions shall not seem capable of abstraction from each other. In other words,' it is presupposed that no entity can be conceived in complete abstraction from the system of the universe, and that it is the business of speculative philosophy to exhibit this truth. This character is its coherence
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
whitehead concluded the new philosophy is not foisted with abstractions but rather it is a critique of abstractions.
Unlike Kant, whitehead explains that, the ideal of speculative philosophy has its rational side and its empirical side. The rational side is expressed by the terms 'coherent' and 'logical.' The empirical side is expressed by the terms 'applicable' and 'adequate.' But the two sides are bound together by clearing away an ambiguity which remains in the previous explanation of the term 'adequate”
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
Whitehead’s point is that the philosophical method must operate in a manner that all related experience must exhibit the same texture which is different from Kant’s synthetic a priori judgment where sensibility and understanding are congruent. “Thus the philosophic scheme should be ‘necessary,' in the sense of bearing in itself its own warrant of universality throughout an experience, provided that we confine ourselves to that which communicates with immediate matter of fact
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. This doctrine of necessity in universality means that there is an essence to the universe which forbids relationships beyond itself, as a violation of its rationality. Speculative philosophy seeks that essence
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. Whitehead therefore reveals his plans in exhibiting his speculative philosophy via his philosophy of organism.
Since his aim is to render everything in the scheme of thought explicit. Whitehead comes to real terms the language required for this new philosophical thought. Whitehead wants to show that “the primary notions which constitute the philosophy of organism… embodies generic notions inevitably presupposed in our reflective experience-presupposed, but rarely expressed in explicit distinction… These notions are, that of an 'actual entity,' that of a 'prehension,' that of a 'nexus,' and that of the 'ontological principle.'
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. Whitehead explains that his usage of this new terminology is divorce from the previous philosophical approach and the new “philosophical thought has made for itself difficulties by dealing exclusively in very abstract notions, such as those of mere awareness, mere private sensation, mere emotion, mere purpose, mere appearance, mere causation. These are the ghosts of the old 'faculties,' banished from psychology, but still haunting metaphysics. There can be no 'mere' togetherness of such abstractions. The result is that philosophical discussion is enmeshed in the fallacy of 'misplaced concreteness.' In the three notions-actual entity, prehension, nexus-an endeavour has been made to base philosophical thought upon the most concrete elements in our experience
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
“Actual entities' -also termed 'actual occasions' -are the final real things--, of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real… The final facts are, all alike, actual entities; and these actual entities are drops of experience, complex and interdependent”. Whitehead makes us to understand that, the reality of the world are actual entities, they are the real things that made up the world.
In order to go against the bifurcation of abstractions, whitehead introduces prehensions, actual entities or occasions and eternal objects to explain the nexus of the world. Since the old philosophical thought was abstracted from experience or was dealing with abstractions, whitehead affirms that “the true philosophic question is, how can concrete fact exhibit entities abstract from it and yet participated in by its own nature? he answers that the new philosophical thought has “its business is to explain the emergence of the more abstract things from the more concrete things. Thus, philosophy is explanatory of abstraction, and not of concreteness
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
And in the
science and the modern, he writes, “I hold that philosophy is the critic of abstractions. Its function is the double one, first of harmonizing them by assigning to them their right relative status as abstractions, and secondly of completing them by direct comparison with more concrete intuitions of the universe, and thereby promoting the formation of more complete schemes of thought
| [11] | Alfred North Whitehead, Science and The Modern World, New York: The New American Library of World Literature, inc. 1925, PP. 1-212. |
[11].
2.3. The Necessity to Continue with Kant’s Project
The questions that preoccupy here is, what were Kant’s project? Or what constitute Kant’s project? And how did whitehead continue this project? we will begin with Kant’s project, later whitehead’s project as a continuity of Kant’s project and subsequently, the comparative analysis on the objectives of the different projects.
Kant’s project was an “attempted to criticize and limit the scope of traditional metaphysics, Kant also sought to defend against empiricists its underlying claim of the possibility of universal and necessary knowledge -what Kant called a priori knowledge, knowledge originating independently of experience, because no knowledge derived from any particular experience, or a posteriori knowledge, could justify a claim to universal and necessary validity
| [8] | Immanuel Kant, Critique of pure reason, The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge University Press, 1998. PP. 1-785. |
[8]
.
‘Kant's position thus required him not only to undermine the arguments of traditional metaphysics but also to put in their place a scientific metaphysics of his own, which establishes what can be known a priori but also limits it to that which is required for ordinary experience and its extension into natural science. Kant therefore had to find a way to limit the pretensions of the dogmatists while still defending metaphysics as a science which is both possible (as was denied by the skeptics) and necessary (as was denied by the indifferentists). Thus Kant had to fight a war on several different fronts
| [8] | Immanuel Kant, Critique of pure reason, The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge University Press, 1998. PP. 1-785. |
[8].
Kant intentions while placing the limits of both rational dogmatists and the empiricists has a real project which was to demonstrate the possibility and the important of a “science of metaphysics” or a scientific metaphysics. “This new science, which Kant calls "transcendental" does not deal directly with objects of empirical cognition, but investigates the conditions of the possibility of our experience of them by examining the mental capacities that are required for us to have any cognition of objects at all. Kant agrees with Locke that we have no innate knowledge, that is, no knowledge of any particular propositions implanted in us by God or nature prior to the commencement of our individual experience. But experience is the product both of external objects affecting our sensibility and of the operation of our cognitive faculties in response to this effect, and Kant's claim is that we can have "pure" or a priori cognition of the contributions to experience made by the operation of these faculties themselves, rather than of the effect of external objects on us in experience. Kant divides our cognitive capacities into our receptivity to the effects of external objects acting on us and giving us sensations, through which these objects are given to us in empirical intuition, and our active faculty for relating the data of intuition by thinking them under concepts, which is called understanding (A 191 B 33), and forming judgments about them. As already suggested, this division is the basis for Kant's division of the "Transcendental Doctrine of Elements" into the "Transcendental Aesthetic," which deals with sensibility and its pure form, and the "Transcendental Logic," which deals with the operations of the understanding and judgment as well as both the spurious and the legitimate activities of theoretical reason
| [8] | Immanuel Kant, Critique of pure reason, The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge University Press, 1998. PP. 1-785. |
[8].
The "Transcendental Logic" turns to the main destructive task of the
Critique of Pure Reason, and that which gives it its name, the task of discrediting dogmatism and displaying the limits of metaphysics. The "Transcendental Analytic" has prepared the way for this critique of traditional metaphysics and its foundations by its argument that synthetic a priori principles can be established only within the limited domain of sensible experience. But Kant's aim in the "Dialectic" is not only to show the failure of a metaphysics that transcends the boundaries of possible experience. At the same time, he also wants to demonstrate that the questions that preoccupy metaphysics are inevitable, and that the arguments of metaphysics, although deceptive, should not be dismissed without sympathetic comprehension
| [8] | Immanuel Kant, Critique of pure reason, The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge University Press, 1998. PP. 1-785. |
[8]
.
Whitehead’s own project was what he called the “philosophy of organism”. Therefore, to him, the philosophy of organism aspires to construct a critique of pure feeling, in the philosophical position in which Kant put his Critique of Pure Reason
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. The critique of pure reasons asks a main question, how is synthetic a priori knowledge possible? Kant answer that knowledge comes from sensory input plus mind categories, that is space, time and causality. Whitehead continued that the philosophy of organism would also supersede the remaining Critiques required in the Kantian philosophy. Thus, in the organic philosophy Kant's 'Transcendental Aesthetic' becomes a distorted fragment of what should have been his main topic”
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. This argument of whitehead exposed the critics and the limits of Kant. This new philosophy starts its discussion from the predecessors of Kant to whom Kant’s project was on the subject matter of his predecessors. For he admits in the
process and reality that “these lectures are based upon a recurrence to that phase of philosophic thought which began with Descartes and ended with Hume. The philosophic scheme which they endeavour to explain is termed the 'Philosophy of Organism
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
Whitehead still in the preface of
process and reality affirms that “The philosophy of organism is a recurrence to pre-Kantian modes of thought. These philosophers were perplexed by the inconsistent presuppositions underlying their inherited modes of expression. In so far as they, or their successors, have endeavoured to be rigidly systematic, the tendency has been to abandon just those elements in their thought upon which the philosophy of organism bases itself. An endeavor has been made to point out the exact points of agreement and of disagreement
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. so whitehead admits that from Descartes to Hume, they have attempted to explain the philosophy of organism but has miss out something and therefore his mission and vision is to realized or complete what they left out. Consequently, Whitehead explains that “in modern philosophy Descartes' two kinds of substance, corporeal and mental, illustrate incoherence. There is, in Descartes' philosophy, no reason why there should not be a one-substance world, only corporeal, or a one-substance world, only mental. According to Descartes, a substantial individual 'requires nothing but itself in order to exist.' Thus this system makes a virtue of its incoherence. But, on the other hand, the facts seem connected, while Descartes' system does not; for example, in the treatment of the body-mind problem. The Cartesian system obviously says something that is true. But its notions are too abstract to penetrate into the nature of things”
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5].
Whitehead equally agrees that “The fundamental notion of the philosophy of organism is expressed in Locke's phrase, "it is past doubt there must be some real constitution, on which any collection of simple ideas co-existing must depend." Locke makes it plain (d. II, II, 1) that by a 'simple idea' he means the ingression in the actual entity (illustrated by 'a piece of wax,' 'a piece of ice,' 'a rose') of some abstract quality which is not complex (illustrated by 'softness,' 'warmth,' 'whiteness'). For Locke such simple ideas, coexistingt in an actual entity, require a real constitution for that entity. Now in the philosophy of organism, passing beyond Locke's explicit statement, the notion of a real constitution is taken to mean that the eternal objects function by introducing the multiplicity of actual entities as constitutive of the actual entity in question. Thus, the constitution is 'real' because it assigns its status in the real world to the actual entity. In other words, the actual entity, in virtue of being what it is, is also where it is. It is somewhere because it is some actual thing with its correlated actual world. This is the direct denial of the Cartesian doctrine, "... an existent thing which requires nothing but itself in order to exist."
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
.
If Descartes and Locke haven’t used abstract notions as described by whitehead in the above affirmations, they would have realized the philosophy of organism, thus a quasi-realization of the philosophy of organism. Whitehead suggests that "the aim of the philosophy of organism is to express a coherent cosmology based upon the notions of 'system,' 'process,' 'creative advance into novelty,'”
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
Since his aim was to obtain a one-substance cosmology, he said “'prehensions' are a generalization from Descartes' mental 'cogitations,' and from Locke's 'ideas,' to express the most concrete mode of analysis applicable to every grade of individual actuality. Descartes and Locke maintained a two-substance ontology-Descartes explicitly, Locke by implication”
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. Just like Kant, whitehead seeks to reconcile the reconciled the two-substance ontology put forth by locke’s empiricists nature and Descartes’s rationalists’ nature. Based on this, we seek to demonstrate in this study here that both Kant and whitehead had as plan to synthesize the “two-substance ontology” put forward by Descartes and Locke. Consequently, whitehead’s “prehension” is kant’s “synthetic a priori judgment”.”Whitehead derived the word “prehension” from “apprehension” and connotatively used it as “uncognitive apprehension” which therefore means that a prehension is an embodiment of the “mental and physical capacity”. In the analysis of prehensions in
process and reality, whitehead stated that, “prehensions whose data involve actual entities-are termed 'physical prehensions'; and prehensions of eternal objects are termed 'conceptual prehensions.
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
.“Any instance of our experience is dipolar meaning its involves both the “Physical” and the “mental poles”
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. Thus to whitehead,“a prehension is a process of unifying”
| [11] | Alfred North Whitehead, Science and The Modern World, New York: The New American Library of World Literature, inc. 1925, PP. 1-212. |
[11]
, it is a “Concrete Facts of Relatedness”
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. Because whitehead believes that, “nature is a process of expansive development, necessarily transitional from prehension to prehension… Thus nature is a structure of evolving processes. The reality is the process… The realities of nature are the prehensions in nature, that is to say, the events in nature”
| [11] | Alfred North Whitehead, Science and The Modern World, New York: The New American Library of World Literature, inc. 1925, PP. 1-212. |
[11]
Thus, prehension was introduced to mean the essential unity of events. whitehead process nature wiped out the two-substance ontology while Kant’s necessary and universal bridge the two-substance ontology. Kant’ s synthetic as priori judgement makes our understanding of the world through mind categories whereas whitehead’s prehensions makes our understanding of the world through concrete relational participation. Base on the view of reality Kant affirms that, we know phenomena which are the appearances and unknowable noumena which are things in themselves and whitehead on the other hand, reality is process and relations which are the experience of actual entities to whitehead. To whitehead, space and time emerge from relations while to Kant they are categories of mind in structure experience.
In order to justify the unity of prehensions whitehead admits that “The theory of prehension” embodies a protest against the bifurcation of nature. it embodies even more than that: Its protest is against the bifurcation of actualities. In the analysis of actuality the antithesis between publicity and privacy obtrudes itself at every stage
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
In a further explanation Whitehead tells us that “the theory of prehensions is founded upon the doctrine that there are no concrete facts which are merely public or merely private, the distinction between publicity and privacy is a distinction of reason and is not a distinction between mutually exclusive concrete facts. The sole concrete facts in terms of which actualities can be analyzed are prehensions and every prehensions has its public side and its private side
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. Since every prehension has its public and private side or the physical and mental side respectively. The basic operations of mentality are 'conceptual prehensions.' These are the only operations of 'pure' mentality. All other mental operations are 'impure,' in the sense that they involve integrations of conceptual prehensions with the physical prehensions of the physical pole. Since 'impurity' in prehension refers to the prehension arising out of the integration of 'pure' physical prehensions with 'pure' mental prehensions, it follows that an 'impure' mental prehension is also an 'impure' physical prehension and conversely
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. These analysis on prehensions by whitehead help to wipe out the division between Descartes and Locke by focusing on, what reality is, Kant failed to realize it by focusing on how we know.
Just like Kant who endeavor to demonstrate a scientific metaphysics, whitehead “intended to state a condensed scheme of cosmological ideas, to develop their meaning by confrontation with the various topics of experience, and finally to elaborate an adequate cosmology in terms of which all particular topics find their interconnections
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5].
Since “all modern philosophy hinges round the difficulty of describing the world in terms of subject and predicate, substance and quality, particular and universal. The result always does violence to that immediate experience which we express in our actions, our hopes, our sympathies, our purposes, and which we enjoy in spite of our lack of phrases for its verbal analysis
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. To this effect, whitehead stipulates that “The philosophy of organism is the inversion of Kant's philosophy. The Critique of Pure Reason describes the process by which subjective data pass into the appearance of an objective world. The philosophy of organism seeks to describe how objective data pass into subjective satisfaction, and how order in the objective data provides intensity in the subjective satisfaction. For Kant, the world emerges from the subject; for the philosophy of organism, the subject emerges from the world-a (superject' rather than a 'subject.' The word (object' thus means an entity which is a potentiality for being a component in feeling; and the word (subject' means the entity constituted by the process of feeling, and including this process
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5].
Whitehead’s problem with Kant is that, he adopted a subjective position and this reverses his philosophy to the position of predecessors”.
Despite whitehead’s inversion or disagrees with Kant’s proposed philosophy of organism but to an extent agreed with him but for a different reason. It is agreed that the functioning of concepts is an essential factor in knowledge, so that 'intuitions without concepts are blind.' But for Kant, apart from concepts there is nothing to know; since objects related in a knowable world are the product of conceptual functioning whereby categoreal form is introduced into the sense datum, which otherwise is intuited in the form of a mere spatio-temporal flux of sensations. Knowledge requires that this mere flux be particularized by conceptual functioning, whereby the flux is understood as a nexus of 'objects.' Thus, for Kant the process whereby there is experience is a process from subjectivity to apparent objectivity. The philosophy of organism inverts this analysis, and explains the process as proceeding from objectivity to subjectivity, namely, from the objectivity, whereby the external world is a datum, to the subjectivity, whereby there is one individual experience. Thus, according to the philosophy of organism, in every act of experience there are objects for knowledge; but, apart from the inclusion of intellectual functioning in that act of experience, there is no knowledge
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. This is how whitehead reconciled the fight between rationalism and empiricism. From here we proceed by proposing that, the manner in which whitehead tackled his process philosophy suggest a posthumanism perspective.
A viewpoint known as posthumanism seeks to dismantle the borders and hierarchies that separate humans from other beings by highlighting the interdependence of organisms and complex systems. Broadly speaking, "posthumanist" theories aim to take into account the new ways that power is exercised in societies with more than humans as well as the indisputable involvement of non-human actors like nature and technology. Rosi Braidotti, one of the prominent scholars of posthumanism, says that we are now witnessing a convergence of two major movements—posthumanism, which rejects “the humanist ideal of ‘Man’ as the allegedly universal measure of all things,” and post-anthropocentrism, “which rejects species hierarchy and human exceptionalism” (Bradiotti, 2019)
| [12] | Shoukatali Hulagoor, posthumanism and environmental sustainability: reconsidering our bond with nature, An International Refereed e-Journal of Literary Explorations, Vol. 13 Issue I, 2025. |
[12]
. philosophically, Posthumanism encounters the idea of mankind as distinct and grander to the natural world, is gradually perceived as a critical lens for speaking environmental sustainability concerns by decentring the human being and recognizing the interconnectedness of all living existences inside an ecosystem, by this means encouraging a further principled and universal approach to environmental care.
Since Posthumanism challenges the anthropocentric view that places humans at the ego-centered of creation and argues for a more inclusive and interconnected understanding of life and whitehead of process philosophy challenges static being as the reality centered and call for a dynamic being which takes processes, relational and interconnectedness of reality. Thus, whitehead process philosophy aligns with the posthumanism focus. That why we think that, whitehead’s project of process philosophy aligns with posthumanism focus. The interactive web of relationships is non-anthropocentric because the interconnectedness of relations includes humans and non-humans, that is nature and objects. The relations prioritize interaction over human centrality. Since process philosophy prioritize becoming over being, it therefore aligns with posthuman focus on processes and not fixed entities. There are no fixed entities because whitehead actual entities by reason of being is a network of nexus of relationship. They are the final facts all alike, whitehead describe them as drops of experience, complex and interdependent.
| [5] | Alfred North Whitehead, Process and reality. An essay in cosmology, New York, The free press, 1929, PP. 3-409. |
[5]
. By decentering the human, posthumanism encourages a shift in perspective that recognizes the intrinsic value of all beings and the interconnectedness of all lives, whitehead process philosophy seeks this essence. Just like posthumanism, whitehead process philosophy acknowledges the agency of non-human entities, such as animals, plants, and ecosystems. To him, nature is a structure of revolving processes and reality is a process, the realities of nature are the prehensions in nature, that is to say the events in nature, the term prehension signify the essential unity of an event
| [11] | Alfred North Whitehead, Science and The Modern World, New York: The New American Library of World Literature, inc. 1925, PP. 1-212. |
[11].