Beyond the Confessional State: Power, Authority, and Political Order in Contemporary Lebanon

Shaul Michael Gabbay

doi:doi:10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.11

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Beyond the Confessional State: Power, Authority, and Political Order in Contemporary Lebanon

Shaul Michael Gabbay^*

Published in Journal of Political Science and International Relations (Volume 9, Issue 4)

Received: 27 September 2026 Accepted: 5 October 2026 Published: 23 October 2026

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Abstract

Lebanon is commonly interpreted through confessionalism, but formal confessional institutions alone do not explain how citizens obtain access to the state, how organizations exercise authority, or why political arrangements persist through repeated crises. This article presents a conceptual synthesis of scholarship on Lebanese confessionalism, clientelism, welfare provision, civil society, political economy, and armed authority, supplemented by recent survey research and primary institutional reporting on developments after 2019. It compares how brokerage and relational access operate across political families, sectarian parties, welfare organizations, municipalities, armed actors, diaspora ties, and foreign patronage, and how successive economic, institutional, and security shocks alter the value of those relationships. The analysis is interpretive rather than statistical and does not claim representative measurement of individual attitudes or causal effects. Building on Portes's treatment of the negative consequences of social capital and on network theory's account of position-dependent resources, the article uses social liability to identify the costs attached to otherwise useful ties and network revaluation to trace changes in their practical value. The Lebanese evidence indicates that scarcity can simultaneously weaken patrons' distributive capacity and increase the premium on privileged access, while institutional reform matters to the extent that citizens become less dependent on brokers. The declining need to locate “the right person” is proposed as an observable indicator of reform.

Published in	Journal of Political Science and International Relations (Volume 9, Issue 4)
DOI	10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.11
Page(s)	258-266
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2026. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Lebanon, Confessionalism, Political Order, Clientelism, Social Capital, Social Liability, Network Revaluation, State-Society Relations

References

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APA Style

Gabbay, S. M. (2026). Beyond the Confessional State: Power, Authority, and Political Order in Contemporary Lebanon. Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 9(4), 258-266. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.11

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ACS Style

Gabbay, S. M. Beyond the Confessional State: Power, Authority, and Political Order in Contemporary Lebanon. J. Polit. Sci. Int. Relat. 2026, 9(4), 258-266. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.11

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AMA Style

Gabbay SM. Beyond the Confessional State: Power, Authority, and Political Order in Contemporary Lebanon. J Polit Sci Int Relat. 2026;9(4):258-266. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.11

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@article{10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.11,
  author = {Shaul Michael Gabbay},
  title = {Beyond the Confessional State: Power, Authority, and Political Order in Contemporary Lebanon},
  journal = {Journal of Political Science and International Relations},
  volume = {9},
  number = {4},
  pages = {258-266},
  doi = {10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.11},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.11},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jpsir.20260904.11},
  abstract = {Lebanon is commonly interpreted through confessionalism, but formal confessional institutions alone do not explain how citizens obtain access to the state, how organizations exercise authority, or why political arrangements persist through repeated crises. This article presents a conceptual synthesis of scholarship on Lebanese confessionalism, clientelism, welfare provision, civil society, political economy, and armed authority, supplemented by recent survey research and primary institutional reporting on developments after 2019. It compares how brokerage and relational access operate across political families, sectarian parties, welfare organizations, municipalities, armed actors, diaspora ties, and foreign patronage, and how successive economic, institutional, and security shocks alter the value of those relationships. The analysis is interpretive rather than statistical and does not claim representative measurement of individual attitudes or causal effects. Building on Portes's treatment of the negative consequences of social capital and on network theory's account of position-dependent resources, the article uses social liability to identify the costs attached to otherwise useful ties and network revaluation to trace changes in their practical value. The Lebanese evidence indicates that scarcity can simultaneously weaken patrons' distributive capacity and increase the premium on privileged access, while institutional reform matters to the extent that citizens become less dependent on brokers. The declining need to locate “the right person” is proposed as an observable indicator of reform.},
 year = {2026}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Beyond the Confessional State: Power, Authority, and Political Order in Contemporary Lebanon
AU  - Shaul Michael Gabbay
Y1  - 2026/10/23
PY  - 2026
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.11
DO  - 10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.11
T2  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
JF  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
JO  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
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EP  - 266
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2640-2785
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.11
AB  - Lebanon is commonly interpreted through confessionalism, but formal confessional institutions alone do not explain how citizens obtain access to the state, how organizations exercise authority, or why political arrangements persist through repeated crises. This article presents a conceptual synthesis of scholarship on Lebanese confessionalism, clientelism, welfare provision, civil society, political economy, and armed authority, supplemented by recent survey research and primary institutional reporting on developments after 2019. It compares how brokerage and relational access operate across political families, sectarian parties, welfare organizations, municipalities, armed actors, diaspora ties, and foreign patronage, and how successive economic, institutional, and security shocks alter the value of those relationships. The analysis is interpretive rather than statistical and does not claim representative measurement of individual attitudes or causal effects. Building on Portes's treatment of the negative consequences of social capital and on network theory's account of position-dependent resources, the article uses social liability to identify the costs attached to otherwise useful ties and network revaluation to trace changes in their practical value. The Lebanese evidence indicates that scarcity can simultaneously weaken patrons' distributive capacity and increase the premium on privileged access, while institutional reform matters to the extent that citizens become less dependent on brokers. The declining need to locate “the right person” is proposed as an observable indicator of reform.
VL  - 9
IS  - 4
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Author Information

Shaul Michael Gabbay

Posner Center for International Development, Global Research Institute, Denver, United States

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http://orcid.org/0009-0003-5297-5838

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Plain Text BibTeX RIS

APA Style

Gabbay, S. M. (2026). Beyond the Confessional State: Power, Authority, and Political Order in Contemporary Lebanon. Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 9(4), 258-266. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.11

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ACS Style

Gabbay, S. M. Beyond the Confessional State: Power, Authority, and Political Order in Contemporary Lebanon. J. Polit. Sci. Int. Relat. 2026, 9(4), 258-266. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.11

Copy | Download

AMA Style

Gabbay SM. Beyond the Confessional State: Power, Authority, and Political Order in Contemporary Lebanon. J Polit Sci Int Relat. 2026;9(4):258-266. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.11

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.11,
  author = {Shaul Michael Gabbay},
  title = {Beyond the Confessional State: Power, Authority, and Political Order in Contemporary Lebanon},
  journal = {Journal of Political Science and International Relations},
  volume = {9},
  number = {4},
  pages = {258-266},
  doi = {10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.11},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.11},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jpsir.20260904.11},
  abstract = {Lebanon is commonly interpreted through confessionalism, but formal confessional institutions alone do not explain how citizens obtain access to the state, how organizations exercise authority, or why political arrangements persist through repeated crises. This article presents a conceptual synthesis of scholarship on Lebanese confessionalism, clientelism, welfare provision, civil society, political economy, and armed authority, supplemented by recent survey research and primary institutional reporting on developments after 2019. It compares how brokerage and relational access operate across political families, sectarian parties, welfare organizations, municipalities, armed actors, diaspora ties, and foreign patronage, and how successive economic, institutional, and security shocks alter the value of those relationships. The analysis is interpretive rather than statistical and does not claim representative measurement of individual attitudes or causal effects. Building on Portes's treatment of the negative consequences of social capital and on network theory's account of position-dependent resources, the article uses social liability to identify the costs attached to otherwise useful ties and network revaluation to trace changes in their practical value. The Lebanese evidence indicates that scarcity can simultaneously weaken patrons' distributive capacity and increase the premium on privileged access, while institutional reform matters to the extent that citizens become less dependent on brokers. The declining need to locate “the right person” is proposed as an observable indicator of reform.},
 year = {2026}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Beyond the Confessional State: Power, Authority, and Political Order in Contemporary Lebanon
AU  - Shaul Michael Gabbay
Y1  - 2026/10/23
PY  - 2026
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.11
DO  - 10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.11
T2  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
JF  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
JO  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
SP  - 258
EP  - 266
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2640-2785
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.11
AB  - Lebanon is commonly interpreted through confessionalism, but formal confessional institutions alone do not explain how citizens obtain access to the state, how organizations exercise authority, or why political arrangements persist through repeated crises. This article presents a conceptual synthesis of scholarship on Lebanese confessionalism, clientelism, welfare provision, civil society, political economy, and armed authority, supplemented by recent survey research and primary institutional reporting on developments after 2019. It compares how brokerage and relational access operate across political families, sectarian parties, welfare organizations, municipalities, armed actors, diaspora ties, and foreign patronage, and how successive economic, institutional, and security shocks alter the value of those relationships. The analysis is interpretive rather than statistical and does not claim representative measurement of individual attitudes or causal effects. Building on Portes's treatment of the negative consequences of social capital and on network theory's account of position-dependent resources, the article uses social liability to identify the costs attached to otherwise useful ties and network revaluation to trace changes in their practical value. The Lebanese evidence indicates that scarcity can simultaneously weaken patrons' distributive capacity and increase the premium on privileged access, while institutional reform matters to the extent that citizens become less dependent on brokers. The declining need to locate “the right person” is proposed as an observable indicator of reform.
VL  - 9
IS  - 4
ER  -

Copy | Download