Research Article
House of Representatives Leadership Recruitment and Executive Interference in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic:
A Comparative Institutional Analysis
Folarin Olusola Olugbenga*
Issue:
Volume 9, Issue 2, June 2026
Pages:
113-121
Received:
19 November 2025
Accepted:
12 December 2025
Published:
13 April 2026
Abstract: This study examines the dynamics of leadership recruitment in Nigeria’s House of Representatives and the persistent patterns of executive interference that have shaped legislative autonomy throughout the Fourth Republic (1999–2023). Anchored on the Separation of Powers framework, the study analyses how informal political practices, party hierarchies, presidential directives, and elite bargaining often undermine constitutional provisions that guarantee internal legislative independence. Using a qualitative research design grounded in documentary and content analysis of legislative records, media reports, constitutional texts, and scholarly literature, the study provides a comparative assessment of Nigeria’s experience alongside other presidential and hybrid democracies such as Brazil, South Africa, India, and Kenya. Particular attention is given to illustrative episodes, including the emergence of Aminu Tambuwal in 2011, the Dogara–Gbajabiamila contest of 2015, and the coordinated lobbying for Gbajabiamila in 2019, which reveal how political negotiations, factional alignments, and executive preferences often supersede autonomous parliamentary choice. The findings show that these interventions weaken legislative oversight, fuel internal factionalism and distort the institutional balance intended by the Nigerian constitutional framework. The study concludes that Nigeria’s democratic consolidation depends on strengthening internal legislative procedures, reinforcing party institutionalism and ensuring strict adherence to the constitutional norms governing leadership selection. By situating Nigeria’s experience within broader comparative patterns, the study contributes to an understanding on how executive–legislative relations influence institutional performance in emerging presidential democracies.
Abstract: This study examines the dynamics of leadership recruitment in Nigeria’s House of Representatives and the persistent patterns of executive interference that have shaped legislative autonomy throughout the Fourth Republic (1999–2023). Anchored on the Separation of Powers framework, the study analyses how informal political practices, party hierarchie...
Show More
Research Article
Few Remarks on the Duty to Notify National Law Drafts to a European Institution
Magdalena Katz*
Issue:
Volume 9, Issue 2, June 2026
Pages:
122-129
Received:
14 March 2026
Accepted:
26 March 2026
Published:
11 May 2026
DOI:
10.11648/j.jpsir.20260902.12
Downloads:
Views:
Abstract: Since the establishment of the European Union, Member States do not have complete free reign over their legislative activity. The influence of the EU institutions on new national laws has become stronger with the passage of time. Over the years, the Contracting States and the Union legislature have established an increasing number of obligations for national legislatures. The most common practice is the well-known duty to transpose directives into national law. These EU legal acts contain substantive law, rights and/or obligations for individuals, and thus encompass material provisions that can be subject to a transposition process. However, this is not the only way to influence national legal orders. A similar but far more complicated tool constitute procedural obligations to consult EU institutions on national draft laws. These obligations provide EU institutions with extraordinary powers to exercise their influence over national legal orders. Recently EU legislature established with Two-Pack ex ante control of national budgetary laws, a further obligation to notify Member States’ law to the Commission. A judicial review of these procedural duties runs also in an extraordinary way. While the Court of Justice of the EU introduced the terminus technicus “substantial procedural defect”, I would like to coin the term general preliminary ruling and principle of accessory division of competences.
Abstract: Since the establishment of the European Union, Member States do not have complete free reign over their legislative activity. The influence of the EU institutions on new national laws has become stronger with the passage of time. Over the years, the Contracting States and the Union legislature have established an increasing number of obligations fo...
Show More
